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Abstract: Here are some things everyone knows about the legal realists: They didn’t believe
in legal rules, they thought—and demonstrated—that law is inherently indeterminate, and
they taught us that it is the personality of the judge that decided cases. To the extent that they
studied legal doctrine, it was in order to demonstrate its incoherence. This is why they “vociferously objected” to the Restatements. It is the victory of their ideas that killed the doctrinal legal treatise as a respectable form of scholarship in the United States. In addition to this
jurisprudential radicalism, the legal realists were also politically radical. Their work burst
the myth of legal objectivity by mercilessly exposing the political ideology of Lochner v.
New York. More generally, their skepticism about legal rules exposed the inherent contradictions of liberal legalism.
Now for some inconvenient facts: Most legal realists believed legal rules existed and mattered for legal decisions, they believed the law is mostly determinate, and worked to make it
more so. Most of them never mentioned Lochner in their writings; the few who did dismissed
the idea that the majority was driven by laissez faire ideology. What did they stand for, then?
I argue in this Article that one way of getting a sense of what the realists believed is by
looking at who they considered their intellectual allies. This exercise yields some surprising
results. Rather than seeing the writing of a legal treatise as inconsistent with legal realism,
they praised Arthur Corbin’s treatise for its realism. Benjamin Cardozo was described as one
of the most sophisticated “anti-realist” judges of the last century, and yet virtually all the
legal realists admired him. The realists similarly admired the work of Wesley Hohfeld, not
because it revealed law’s reactionary politics, but because, as Llewellyn put it, it “cuts very
close to the atomic structure of the law on its conceptual side.” Almost all legal realists spoke
in favor of the Restatements, and many were involved in them.
Does this mean the familiar narrative of the realists’ opposition to the ideas of Langdell and
Beale is also mistaken? Not quite. The realists did object to their ideas, but—and here comes
another surprise—theirs was not a modernist challenge to the “classical” ideas of their predecessors. Rather, legal realists like Llewellyn and Frank were traditionalists who sought to
revive old ideas being lost due to the modernistic project spearheaded by Langdell’s Harvard.
Introduction ...........................................................................................................................
I. The Realists’ Unexpected Heroes ....................................................................................
A. Arthur Corbin’s Treatise.............................................................................................
B. Wesley Hohfeld’s Analytics .......................................................................................
C. Thomas Scrutton’s Commercial Sense .......................................................................
D. E Pluribus Unum: The Restatements and the Uniform Commercial Code.................
E. The Real(ist) Benjamin Cardozo.................................................................................
II. The Reality of Legal Realism .........................................................................................
A. The Modernist Langdell .............................................................................................
B. The Realist Antimodernist Reaction ...........................................................................
IV. Conclusion .....................................................................................................................

*

Professor of law, Osgoode Hall Law School. Thanks to the (remote) audience at London South Bank University, and to David Dennis and Luca Malagoli for their comments.
Thanks also to John Schlegel for his written comments on an earlier draft. Jerome Frank’s
letters quoted in this article are all archived at the Yale University library.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4142277

INTRODUCTION
Described by Richard Posner as “the worst book ever written by a professor
at a major law school,”1 Fred Rodell’s Woe Unto You, Lawyers! suggested,
among other things, that the practice of law be made a crime.2 When it was
first published, some readers considered it an elaborate satire,3 but Rodell insisted he meant it all in earnest. And so, when in
he was about to publish
a second edition of the book, he looked for someone to give the book some
heft, and he turned to Jerome Frank to write a few introductory remarks.
The rules of the foreword for someone else’s book are unwritten but familiar. The invitation to write such a piece carries with it an implicit acknowledgement that its recipient is a Famous Person, invariably more so than the
author of the book; it typically also implies that Famous Person had been “an
inspiration” for the book. In consideration for being so recognized, the foreword author is required to explain to prospective readers just how groundbreaking is the book they are about to venture into.
Frank was a well-known federal appeal judge and a prolific author. He
published in both academic journals and in general-interest magazines; he
even made it to the cover of Time magazine.4 He somehow also managed to
have a bit of a bad-boy reputation, and had been a role model of sorts for
Rodell.5 Like Rodell, Frank published books that scandalized some of the academic establishment, including the very same establishment where Rodell
was a tenured professor.6 To top it all, a few years earlier Frank recommended
the republication of the book.7 When Jerome Frank agreed to write a short

1

See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW (
). Posner is not alone. When
published, the book elicited generally hostile reactions. See Neil Duxbury, In the Twilight of
Legal Realism: Fred Rodell and the Limits of Legal Critique, OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD.
,
(
). See also note , infra, and accompanying text.
2
FRED RODELL, WOE UNTO YOU LAWYERS!
( d ed.
)(
).
3
Not least among them was Karl Llewellyn. See K.N. Llewellyn, On Reading and
,
(
).
Using the Newer Jurisprudence,
COLUM. L. REV.
4
See
TIME,
Mar.
,
,
http://content.time.com/time/covers/ ,
,
, .html. The issue contained a sympathetic profile. See Intellectual
Mar.
,
,
https://content.time.com/time/subon
the
Spot,
TIME,
scriber/printout/ ,
,
, .html.
5
Rodell admitted his admiration for Frank in Fred Rodell, Book Review,
IND. L.J.
,
(
) (reviewing JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMER)).
ICAN JUSTICE (
6
On the debate over the hiring of Frank at Yale see LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM
AT YALE:
–
, at
– (
).
7
See Jerome Frank, Book Review, J. LEGAL EDUC.
,
n. (
).
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introduction for his book, Rodell must have thought he had the right man for
the job.
With the foreword he produced, Frank indeed proved himself an iconoclast. Ignoring the rules of the genre, he was rather circumspect in his praise
for Rodell’s book. He welcomed its republication, but he “certainly [did]
not”8 agree with all Rodell’s views on lawyers: Rodell, Frank said, “repeat[s]
popular misconceptions of lawyers and judges”;9 he “unfairly ascribes to the
legal profession too much selfishness and hypocrisy; he ignores the many
lawyers who have espoused unpopular causes, and those who have unostentatiously devoted their lives to contriving valuable social inventions designed
to meet the crises of their times.”10 As for the book’s reform proposals, Frank
thought them “too glib,” “hopeless,” “naive,” and “unworkable.”11 Not exactly a ringing endorsement from someone with a reputation of a nihilist who
thought the law was an elaborate cover for judges’ personal preferences.
Here is another anecdote, this one about Karl Llewellyn. Everyone who
knows something about legal realism knows that its existence as a “movement” has much to do with Llewellyn’s essay Some Realism about Realism,
which was written in response to a critical essay by Roscoe Pound.12 In his
reply, the closest thing the realists ever got to a mission statement, Llewellyn
named twenty scholars as legal realists and identified several common themes
found in their works. This exchange is responsible, in part, for the popular
image of the legal realists as young upstarts fighting a powerful old guard, of
radical critique challenging staid conservatism, of Yale and Columbia taking
on Harvard.
Six years after this exchange, Pound published another essay. In it, he
celebrated the common law “as a tradition of taught law,” which relies on
“principles and doctrines” to organize the law in a way that “makes for certainty of application, taking care of the need for stability.” At the same time,
the application of these general principles to particular cases “takes care of
the need for change.” 13 He praised the common law’s ability to achieve
8

Jerome Frank, Introduction to RODELL, supra note , at xi, xii.
Id. at xiv.
10
Id. at xiii.
11
Id. In line with this essay’s thesis, I note that other legal realists were also critical of
Rodell’s book. See Max Radin, Woe Unto You Lawyers: A Review,
MICH. L. REV.
(
). Karl Llewellyn was slightly more friendly but concluded that Rodell’s book “leaves
the reader emotionally and esthetically confused.” Llewellyn, supra note , at
.
12
See Roscoe Pound, The Call for Realist Jurisprudence, HARV. L. REV.
(
);
Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism—Responding to Dean Pound, HARV. L.
(
).
REV.
13
See Roscoe Pound, What Is the Common Law?, in THE FUTURE OF THE COMMON
LAW , (Roscoe Pound ed.,
).
9
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balance the two, “the general security, which calls for stability, and the individual life, which demands change.”14 He mentioned the common law’s age
as one of its strengths,15 but also extoled its enduring “vitality.”16 Pound went
on to warn of “the attacks upon the common law…which are going on in
every corner,”17 and their “challenge [to] the rational and historical methods
on which we had built our faith in the last century.”18 But in his concluding
words, he reassured readers that common law decisions will continue to be a
“quarry for English-speaking judges and lawyers and lawmakers and law
teachers for generations to come.”19
Anyone familiar with standard accounts of legal realism will tell you
these are the kind of vacuous banalities that the legal realists set themselves
against, especially when coming from the former Dean of Harvard Law
School, the law school many of the realists saw as the enemy. Now for the
reality: Llewellyn described Pound’s essay as “[t]he best and most rounded
discussion [he] ha[d] seen in print on what ‘our’ common law is today.”20
Llewellyn acknowledged some differences “in emphasis and even in substance,” but praised the “care and balance” with which Pound identified the
“real and vital things which do make up the essence of our common law.”21
When a few years later he published his own essay on the American common
law tradition, he said many similar things.22
These are minor tidbits in the history of legal realism, but they are illustrative of a bigger point this Article aims to establish: For the most part, the
legal realists were not radical; they were not rule skeptics; they respected legal doctrine; and they were friendly to, often admirers of, the common law.
They believed law was real and thought it was a means for improving society.
All this does not match the prevailing understanding of legal realism,
which sees them as radicals in two distinct but related ways. The first sense
is political: In this sense, the realists are said to have held views that were at
odds with mainstream political values and even inconsistent with democracy.
In the second sense, the realists were radical in a more narrowly legal or
14

Id.
See id. at
(“a tradition with its roots in the Middle Ages is not without advantages”).
16
Id. at .
17
Id. at .
18
Id. at .
19
Id. at .
20
K.N. Llewellyn, On Our Case-Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance (pt. ),
).
YALE L.J. , n. (
21
Id.
22
See K.N. Llewellyn, American Common Law Tradition, and American Democracy,
, at , – .
J. LEGAL & POL. SOC., Oct.
15
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jurisprudential sense, as they denied basic tenets of mainstream legal thought.
In this sense, the realists were skeptics of law’s ability to guide conduct, they
denied that law could have any determinate content, and denied the existence
of legal rules.
Though claims to realist radicalism in either of these senses predate the
rise of critical legal studies in the middle of the
s, I believe it is their
writings that solidified this now-standard image of the legal realists.23 Interpreting the legal realists in their own image, many crits saw the realists as
their
s precursors, and shaped the prevailing understanding of legal realism. It is probably thanks to their frequent drawing of a link between legal
form and political substance, that it is common these days to see the two versions of realist radicalism, the political and the legal, as closely intertwined.
In the words of James Boyle,
[t]he realists started off by pointing to the vacuity, circularity, and medieval
silliness of legal reasoning and by stressing the role of policy rather than rules
in judicial decisions….The implications of their critique were more corrosive
than they imagined…and seemed to undermine belief in the “rule of law” and
thus destabilize the whole story on which the liberal state depended.24

Despite the demise of CLS as an intellectual movement, suggestions that the
realists had a radical political agenda are not entirely a thing of the past and
may even be making something of a comeback.25 Moreover, as the words just
23

For a small sampling see MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERILAW,
–
: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY ch. (
); Joseph William
,
–
(
) (reviewing KALMAN,
Singer, Legal Realism Now,
CALIF. L. REV.
,
–
supra note ); Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, CALIF. L. REV.
(
); Elizabeth Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE POLITICS
, – (David Kairys ed., d ed.
). In Kalman’s
OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE
original account of legal realism, see KALMAN, supra note , politics played a small role.
After being criticized for its absence, see Singer, supra, at
– , Kalman chastised herself
,
for missing it. See Laura Kalman, Eating Spaghetti with a Spoon,
STAN. L. REV.
–
(
) (reviewing NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE
(
)). I think Kalman had the better view the first time around.
24
James Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social
,
(
); accord William W. Fisher III, The Development
Thought,
U. PA. L. REV.
of Modern American Legal Theory and the Judicial Interpretation of the Bill of Rights, in A
AND
CULTURE OF RIGHTS: THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, AND LAW—
, at
,
(Michael J. Lacey & Knud Haakonssen eds.,
) (“the conception of adjudication that dominates most Realist writings is inconsistent with a truly democratic system
of government”). This reading was accepted even by critics of CLS. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss,
).
The Death of Law?, CORNELL L. REV. , (
25
The idea now seems to get a new lease of life with the emergence of the law-andpolitical-economy perspective. See, e.g., Jedediah Britton-Purdy et al., Building a Law-andPolitical-Economy Framework: Beyond the Twentieth-Century Synthesis,
YALE L.J.
CAN
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quoted show, it is not easy to disentangle the two senses of radicalism. According to a standard critique, mainstream political ideology (sometimes
called “legal liberalism”) is premised on the rule of law, which in turn depends on law having sufficiently clear meaning that people may be guided
by. If the latter is the myth, then the political foundation for state authority
collapses with it. Therefore, even though the focus of my essay is on the realists’ jurisprudential claims, I will spend a few pages arguing against the
suggestions that the realists were advancing a radical, let alone nihilist, political agenda.26
All available evidence suggests that most of the realists were standardfare New Deal Democrats, which, as demonstrated by Roosevelt’s four consecutive election victories (followed by one more by Truman), aligned them
with the majority of Americans of their time. Many of them held senior positions in various federal agencies during the Roosevelt administration, some
became federal judges.27 To the extent that they expressed themselves politically, virtually all were well within the political mainstream.28 Contrary to
claims that they held views inimical to democracy, liberal values, or the rule
of law, most of the legal realists were cheerleaders for American democracy
and saw law as a beneficent tool for the improvement of society. Law, Frank
wrote, “is one of the best means worked out by human society for the adjustment of its many difficulties.”29 Charles Clark praised the realists’ work for

,
,
– (
); K. Sabeel Rahman, Domination, Democracy, and Constitutional
Political Economy in the New Gilded Age: Towards a Fourth Wave of Legal Realism?,
,
,
(
). See also Samuel Aber, Legal Realism: An LPE Reading
TEX. L. REV.
List and Introduction, https://lpeproject.org/wp-content/uploads/
/ /Legal-RealismPrimer.pdf.
26
For a different argument for a similar conclusion see Neil Duxbury, The Theory and
,
– (
) (reHistory of American Law and Politics, OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD.
viewing HORWITZ, supra note ).
27
See Roy Kreitner, Biographing Realist Jurisprudence, LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
(
) (book review).
28
I know of only one clear exception. See Felix S. Cohen, The Socialization of Morality, in AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY TODAY AND TOMORROW , – (Horace M. Kallen & Sidney Hook eds.,
) (comparing Soviet communism favorably to the United States). Unlike
some of Cohen’s law review articles, this article was (and remains) virtually unknown, and
so has had very little impact on subsequent assessment of legal realism.
29
Jerome N. Frank, Women Lawyers, WOMEN LAWYERS J., Winter
, at , ; Je,
rome N. Frank, Experimental Jurisprudence and the New Deal, CONG. REC.
,
(
). For a defense of the
(
); Jerome Frank, Book Review, CALIF. L. REV.
regulatory state as a means of protecting democracy see JEROME FRANK, IF MEN WERE ANGELS: SOME ASPECTS OF GOVERNMENT IN A DEMOCRACY – ,
– (
); Llewellyn,
supra note . See also note
, infra, and accompanying text.
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providing a “cleansing” perspective on the actual work of legal institutions
that was necessary for “democratic progress.”30
There is also little basis for the view that the realists interpreted common-law doctrines through a political lens of class interest.31 Though many
realists acknowledged that judges’ background (including their political
views) affected their understanding of the law,32 they did not analyze law in
political terms. Llewellyn, for example, described much of commercial law,
his main area of interest, as “largely non-political in character.”33 It is also
difficult to find in realist writings any hints of “structural” or systemic thinking about how one’s place in society shapes one’s ideology, a staple of CLS
scholarship. It is likewise rare to find in realists’ works the suggestion that
lawyers or judges use the law to promote their own (class or professional)
interests.34 On the contrary, many legal realists who encountered this idea
dismissed it out of hand. 35 Llewellyn called it a “dead horse,” and urged
30

See Charles E. Clark, The Function of Law in a Democratic Society, U. CHI. L.
,
(
); id. at
(“the trend of law and jurisprudence has been healthy, sound,
REV.
and most deserving of encouragement”).
31
Contra William W. Fisher III et al., Introduction to AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, at
xi, xiv (William W. Fisher III et al. eds.,
) (“the fascination with the ideological functions
of legal doctrine manifested in most Critical Legal Studies writings—are all traceable to the
contentions of the Realists”); Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of New Legal
Realism: Can a New World Order Prompt a New Legal Theory, CORNELL L. REV. ,
n.
(
) (“The old legal realists and their immediate predecessors generally associated
the common law with reactionary doctrine”).
32
See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND
( th prtg.
); Llew,
ellyn, supra note , at
– ; Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, HARV. L. REV.
& n. (
); Felix S. Cohen, The Problems of a Functional Jurisprudence, MOD. L.
). For some this personal aspect extended to allowing for some influREV. , & n. (
ence of their health. See Dan Priel, Law Is What the Judge Had for Breakfast: A Brief History
,
– (
).
of an Unpalatable Subject, BUFF. L. REV.
33
WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT
( d ed.
) (quoting from an unpublished memorandum by Llewellyn written in
). Even more
significantly, in an assessment of Benjamin Cardozo’s judicial career, legal realist Walton
Hamilton noted with approval that in cases dealing with New Deal legislation, Cardozo kept
the legal questions separate from the political ones. See Walton H. Hamilton, Cardozo the
). What matters here is not whether one accepts
Craftsman, U. CHI. L. REV. , – (
this view, but that in the course of highly laudatory assessment, a realist praised Cardozo for
keeping politics outside of his legal analysis. This is inconsistent with the CLS mythologizing of the legal realists as an attack on any meaningful distinction between law and politics.
.
See HORWITZ, supra note , at
34
This prominent theme in some CLS writing was subjected to withering criticism. See
– , and the sources cited there.
POSNER, supra note , at
35
Interestingly, one exception is in RODELL, supra note , at
– . But Rodell was
largely ignored and dismissed by other academics, including legal realists, even at his own
law school. See Duxbury, supra note , at
– ,
,
,
.
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readers to ignore the “naivetés” of an author who advanced such ideas.36
Likewise, in a letter to Harold Laski (a socialist scholar who had advanced
something like this view in some of his writings), Frank expressed skepticism
of what he described as “the class-struggle interpretation of legal decisions.”37 One of Frank’s reasons for rejecting this view was that many cases
pitted members of the same class against each other, making it impossible for
courts to carve a consistently pro-ruling class doctrine: “The great majority
of cases which come before the average judge today in this country are of this
character. (Many of them are cases involving disputes between two members
of the working class.)”38 Several decades later, Richard Epstein, not quite the
radical leftist, made a similar point.39
The critique of lawyers, especially those coming out of the top law
schools, for contributing their talents to maintaining and strengthening a
structurally unjust system, is a familiar one among critical scholars.40 It existed also in the days of the legal realists. In an address delivered in
,
legal realist Charles Clark, by then serving as dean of Yale Law School,
acknowledged the charge that lawyers “make[] the business structure yet
more amenable to the tyrant rule of the captains of industry.”41 Clark was not
there to denounce this reality. He proclaimed to be somewhat troubled by it,
although evidently not very much:

36

See Llewellyn, supra note , at
n. . The author in question was Brooke Adams.
Though Llewellyn did not cite anything by him, it is clear from the context that Llewellyn
was attacking Adams’s view that the “dominant class” shapes the law in its favor. See, e.g.,
Brooks Adams, Law under Inequality: Monopoly, in CENTRALIZATION AND THE LAW: SCIENTIFIC LEGAL EDUCATION
, (
).
37
See letter from Jerome Frank to Harold J. Laski, April ,
, at [hereinafter Frank
(
) (book
letter]; cf. Karl N. Llewellyn, Humanity in Action, SURVEY GRAPHIC ,
review) (“[Laski] tends, with characteristically superb disregard for either precision of thinking or bothersome detail, to identify ‘liberalism’ with ‘bourgeois capitalism uncontrolled.’”).
38
See Frank letter, supra note , at Id. at (emphasis omitted). For other realists re,
jecting such ideas see Edward S. Robinson, Psychology and the Law, J. SOC. PHIL.
(
) (“naturalistic jurisprudence will not confine itself…to flippant guesses about the digestion of the judicial breakfast nor will it reduce the judicial process to that oversimple
theory of class struggle”); K.N. Llewellyn, On the Good, the True, the Beautiful, in Law,
,
(
) (refusing to accept “the semi-conspiracy theory” that forU. CHI. L. REV.
malism is “best fitted to rapacity”). For Frank’s critique of historical determinism, including
its Marxist guise, see JEROME FRANK, FATE AND FREEDOM: A PHILOSOPHY FOR FREE AMER).
ICANS (
39
See Richard A. Epstein, The Social Consequences of Common Law Rules, HARV.
,
(
).
L. REV.
40
See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy,
(
).
J. LEGAL EDUC.
41
Charles E. Clark, Legal Education in Modern Society, TUL. L. REV. , (
).
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In an organization emphasizing individualistic activities and with the motive
of private profit largely unrestrained, it is but natural that lawyers should aid
the activities of the strong and predatory buccaneers who have been the arch
prototype of American success. It is the lawyer’s function to aid people to live
together more easily but nevertheless according to their present habits and desires.42

Another strand of the familiar view of the realists as radicals is the oftmade claim that the realists challenged political economic ideas that dominated the legal arena. In particular, again and again one finds statements such
as, “realism was…a reaction against Supreme Court decisions that had invalidated progressive regulatory legislation favored even by many business leaders.”43 Despite the frequency with which this claim is made, there is little
evidence to support it. Search through the works of the most dominant legal
realists—Karl Llewellyn, Jerome Frank, Leon Green, William Wheeler
Cook, Max Radin, and so on—and you will not find in them any serious critique of laissez faire economics or its most famous legal manifestation, Lochner v. New York.44 In fact, as far as I could find, most of them never mentioned
Lochner in any of their writings.45 On the rare occasion one finds the case
mentioned, the discussion is quite different from what the prevailing view
about the legal realists would have you believe. In one of his articles, Llewellyn has a brief discussion of Holmes’s “suggestion that [the] expansion [of
‘due process’] might well reflect a fear of socialism.” Without citing Lochner
(or any other case), Llewellyn replied:
I am quite unwilling to “explain” [the cases] by the mere philosophy of laissezfaire. I am ready to hook it up with such a philosophy, if I can find the way; the
fact of relation is, I think, perceptible. But to see that the two fit well together
is not to solve the problem of process, the problem of how it happened.46

42

Id. at . Clark also praised law schools for legal training that makes them “so valuable to the great law firms specializing in matters of finance.” Id. at .
43
Mensch, supra note , at ; accord HORWITZ, supra note , at
; STEPHEN M.
FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM PREMODERNISM TO POSTMODERNISM: AN INTELLECTUAL VOYAGE
,
(
); Gary Minda, Denial: Not Just a River in Egypt,
,
– (
); see also note , supra. I ignore here a different chalCARDOZO L. REV.
lenge to this narrative, which argues that there never was a Lochner era. See, e.g., William J.
–
Novak, Law and the Social Control of American Capitalism,
EMORY L.J.
(
).
44
U.S. (
).
45
Walton Hamilton discussed Lochner briefly in a few articles, but only after its demise. See Walton H. Hamilton, Common Right, Due Process and Antitrust, LAW & CON, (
); Walton H. Hamilton, The Path of Due Process Law, ETHICS
TEMP. PROBS.
,
– (
)
46
Llewellyn, supra note , at
.
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In other words, Llewellyn preferred to explain trends in the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence by appeal to changes in adjudicative style that he identified in state courts. In his account, in the late nineteenth century American
courts shifted from one “style” of adjudication (he called it the “grand style”)
toward a more “formal style.” Roughly speaking, the grand style is open, sensitive to context, and flexible, whereas the formal style is closed and rigid.
For Llewellyn, Lochner represented the Supreme Court’s rather late adoption
of the formal style that had taken over state courts decades earlier.47 Llewellyn also identified (and celebrated) the re-emergence of the grand style a few
decades later. Once again, he interpreted the move away from Lochner as part
of this more internal jurisprudential change, rather than as a reflection of
changing political-economic ideologies.
When attributing to the realists a critique of anti-regulatory economic or
legal ideology, it is not uncommon to find only citations to works interpreting
the realists rather than the writings of the realists themselves, thus perpetuating the myth. When citing someone from the heyday of realism, it is almost
invariably one person, Robert Hale, lionized in CLS writings as a leading
realist, 48 and someone whose writings greatly influenced other legal realists.49 In fact, there is scant evidence for these claims. Hale was not part of
the list of twenty legal realists that Llewellyn compiled for Some Realism
about Realism (although he was part of the longer list he considered in the
course of drafting the article). 50 More significantly, both socially and

47

See id. Llewellyn mentions Lochner and explains it in a similar way in Carl [sic] N.
,
– (
). As far as
Llewellyn, Impressions of the Conference, U. CIN. L. REV.
I know, this is only of only two times, both brief, that Llewellyn mentioned Lochner by name
in his written work. The other is KARL LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA
n. (Paul Gewirtz ed., Michael Ansaldi trans.,
). Neither criticized the decision’s politics.
48
See, e.g., HORWITZ, supra note , at
– ; Duncan Kennedy, The Stakes of Law,
(
); Singer, supra note , at
– . Anor Hale and Foucault!, LEGAL STUD. F.
other name often mentioned in this context is Morris Cohen, whose relationship to the realists
was complex. He clearly expressed “realist” ideas and did so before the legal realists. See
,
(
). But he
Morris R. Cohen, The Place of Logic in the Law,
HARV. L. REV.
was also critical of the legal realists. See Morris R. Cohen, Justice Holmes and the Nature of
,
– (
).
Law, COLUM. L. REV.
49
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See N.E.H. HULL, ROSCOE POUND AND KARL LLEWELLYN: SEARCHING FOR AN
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE
– (
). Horwitz expressed frustration with Llewellyn’s
list of realists for its “de-emphasis of the substantive political commitments of the Realists.”
,
. For my part, I see this as further evidence that legal
HORWITZ, supra note , at
realism, at least as Llewellyn understood it, did not have strong political commitments.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4142277

intellectually he seems to have had relatively little contact with the legal realists.51 Whatever else one thinks of citation counts, they give a good indication of intellectual interests. No matter how impressed the realists may have
been with Hale’s ideas, their citations indicate they were preoccupied with
different questions and not particularly interested in Hale’s ideas: The combined citations of Hale’s work in articles published by Llewellyn, Frank, and
Underhill Moore can be counted with one hand;52 and that is one more hand
than is needed for counting citations to Hale in the writings of Walton Hamilton, Thurman Arnold, Walter Wheeler Cook, Leon Green or Max Radin.53
In any event, Hale, though a critic of laissez-faire economics, was hardly a
political radical.54
It is also worth noting the almost complete absence from the realists’
scholarly work of any apparent concern with the discrimination or oppression
of minorities. Women were enfranchised in
but still faced pervasive discrimination, including at the legal realists’ bastion at Yale, where they were
not admitted to the undergraduate program until
. (The law school did
admit women, from
.) Throughout the country, African Americans were
still facing openly racist laws and policies. Yet, it is very rare to find any
recognition of such issues in the writings of the legal realists.55
51
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52
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( d Cir.
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J., dissenting).
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COLUM. L. REV.
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s, made him unattractive to critical legal scholars, who by the
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54
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All this suffices, I think, to dispose of the idea that the legal realists were
politically radical. However, those defending claims to the realists’ political
radicalism may be making a more subtle argument. They may concede that
the realists were part of the political mainstream but still argue that their jurisprudential views had radical ramifications about the possibility of liberal
democracy and the rule of law. While the realists may not have been aware
of the full implications of their views, later scholars recognized them and
brought them to light.
The argument leading to this conclusion is quite straightforward. On the
standard understanding, the realists believed there are no legal rules or principles; or that if there are rules, they provide little or no guidance because
standard techniques of legal reasoning allows us to give these rules any content we want; or they thought legal doctrine is nothing more than ex post
rationalization for decisions arrived at based on intuition, personality, or what
the judge had for breakfast. Regardless of the precise formulation, these are
all versions of the widely held view of the realists’ alleged “radical skepticism
about general propositions of law.”56 At its narrowest, this view implies that
there is little point in studying “the law”—a body of legal rules, principles,
and doctrines—because it is not what decides cases. To the extent that a functioning liberal democracy depends on stable law that provides people with
clear guidance, the realists’ jurisprudential skepticism has shown these to be
a pipe dream. And so, whether they realized it or not, the realists’ arguments
have exposed the hollowness of the theoretical assumption necessary for any
viable version of political liberalism.
With or without this further political step, the view that the realists were
jurisprudential radicals remains widely accepted. For example, Brian Leiter
has been scathing in his criticism of CLS scholarship, and particularly their
claims about the legal realists’ political radicalism. However, Leiter still identifies legal realism with quite radical claims about law. What he called “the
Core Claim” of legal realism is the idea that “judges reach decisions based
on what they think would be fair on the facts of the case, rather than on the
basis of the applicable rules of law.”57 This amounts to the view that legal
rules are largely epiphenomenal, that they play little to no role in determining
the outcomes of cases. That this is no exaggeration of Leiter’s views is affirmed by the fact that he argued that the realists were mostly “quietists”
about normative questions on law. His rationale: There is little point in proposing normative reforms to the law if judges do not decide cases by

56

Michael S. Moore, Legal Reality: A Naturalist Approach to Legal Ontology,
,
(
).
57
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LAW

following legal rules.58 Hanoch Dagan presented a very different understanding of legal realism, which also eschewed claims to realist political radicalism. Yet he too attributed to the realists the claim that legal doctrine is thoroughly and irredeemably indeterminate, thus rendering its capacity to constrain largely an illusion.59
These views are broadly in line with each other in seeing the realists as
skeptics, or at least minimalists, about legal doctrine. They also broadly fit
the casual usage of the term “legal realism” in academic discourse. In countless works, scholars with different interests and of widely divergent intellectual orientations take “legal realism” to mean a skeptical view about legal
rules and legal doctrine. It is now often taken for granted that legal realism
was a “wholesale assault on the jurisprudence of forms, concepts, and
rules,”60 that the legal realists believed that “judges decide cases in whatever
way ‘seems good to them,’”61 that they believed “legal doctrine is meaningless,”62 or that it was “mere window dressing.”63
My central claim in this Article is that just like the alleged political radicalism of the realists, these claims are also serious distortions. There are different ways of demonstrating this, but the examples I began with illustrate
the method I employ in this essay. It may be called “the Cervantes approach”
after the well-known aphorism attributed to the author of Don Quixote: Tell

58
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me who you friends are and I will tell you who you are.64 Against still-familiar claims that the realists were “radicals,” “iconoclasts,” and “skeptics”
about law and legal doctrine, I suggest we look at the realists’ intellectual
friends and heroes, at those that the realists admired and why they admired
them, as a way of getting a better sense of who the realists were. The results
of this exercise, I argue, yield surprising findings.
The Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, I consider several scholars,
judges, and scholarly projects that one would expect the realists to disapprove
of, if they had been radical skeptics about law and legal doctrine. In fact, each
of these has been described by some commentators as opposed to realism.
Yet, as I show, the realists themselves were largely supportive, at times even
admirers, of these supposed opponents. To give just one example, in the familiar narrative virtually all legal realists “vociferously objected” to the project of restating American common law launched by the American Law Institute in
, often described as the legal establishment’s response to the advent of realist ideas.65 I show that this is not true. The majority of legal realists
supported the Restatements project and many of them were involved in it.
Many of the realists praised the results; to the extent that they criticized the
Restatements, most of their critiques were constructive, affirming the value
of the enterprise but seeking its expansion. In fact, realists often criticized the
Restatements for paying insufficient attention to it. Part II then proceeds by
seeking to explain what the realists’ view was. It approaches this question by
considering a possible challenge: if the realists’ views were so standard, was
there anything novel in any of their claims? A negative answer to this question
was made by Brian Tamanaha in a book he published a few years ago. Tamanaha argued that many of the ideas nowadays attributed to the realists and
considered intellectual innovations, were said by their predecessors. Based
on these historical findings, he went on to argue that there was nothing novel
about the realists’ ideas and that there is no meaningful distinction between
legal realism and legal formalism.66
My argument in Part I may seem to support this conclusion, but Part II
explains why it is unwarranted. It begins by outlining a distinction between
two realist camps. Briefly, one group was realistic in that it wanted greater
connection between law as studied and taught at university and law in practice; for the other group, realism meant greater ties with the natural and social
64
See MIGUEL DE CERVANTES, DON QUIXOTE
(Oxford World’s Classics, Charles
Jarvis trans.,
)(
) (“Tell me your company, and I will tell you what you are”) (internal
quotations omitted).
65
KALMAN, supra note , at .
66
See BRIAN TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST–REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF
POLITICS IN JUDGING ,
(
).
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sciences. Focusing on the first, more dominant group, I then explain in what
way the practice-oriented group was challenging Langdellian formalism. My
argument there again challenges the received narrative. Against the view that
sees the realists as a modernist challenge to “classical” legal thought, I argue
that the realists put forward a traditionalist reaction against modernistic
trends.
Before proceeding, let me preface my argument with two methodological clarifications. First, some of the historical scholarship on the legal realists
has tended to minimize debates over ideas at the expense of what Natalie Hull
called the “human story,”67 or by telling us that intellectual history is “the
history of intellectuals.”68 Scouring university archives where the papers of
the legal realists and their contemporaries are stored, historians found rich
troves for behind-the-scenes stories of friendships and betrayals, of fights
over faculty hires and resignations, even of failing marriages and alcoholism.
Armed with these, historians have retold the story of legal realism. The results
are often entertaining and sometimes illuminating, turning names in footnotes
into human lives. However, too many times, such an approach has led to overemphasis of the personal or psychological over the ideological. Specifically,
proponents of this approach have occasionally suggested that biographical
information can show that what may appear from academic writings as disagreement over ideas, was actually motivated by more earthly concerns such
as a personal crisis, or the pursuit of a better job.
A full discussion of these methodological suppositions has to wait for
another occasion, so here I will just assert that I disagree with the view that
implies that we cannot really understand thinkers thought until we gain access
to their private papers and that there is much to be gained in debates over
ideas by turning them into clashes of personalities. Especially when it comes
to individuals whose professional life involved writing, sometimes in copious
amounts, for public consumption, it is in these works that we can expect to
find their most worked out thoughts. It is true that freedom from the constraints imposed by academic conventions and publicity can sometimes result
in a clearer and more forthright statement of a scholar’s ideas than what is
found in his or her published works. But such an approach still uses archival
materials to get a better sense of scholars’ ideas, not as a means for discovering their ulterior motives. Furthermore, while writing for publication may
67
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hide some things, archival material is also “edited”: both in the sense that
people may not say everything they think (especially if they start thinking
about their posterity and their future donation of their papers), and in the
sense that they may remove some items from the materials that the public is
given access to. A separate reason for paying less attention to archival material is that the private information found in it rarely affects public discourse.
Even if a scholar was motivated to write something for personal gain or due
to personal animus, these considerations, if truly private, cannot affect subsequent public debate. Thus, whatever influence the legal realists’ ideas have
had, it was in the form they took in their publicly available scholarship.
A different reason for turning to the archives may be the thought that by
now, everything the realists said in their published works has been carefully
read and analyzed. Therefore, any hope of finding anything novel about the
legal realists could possibly only come from examining their unpublished
materials. This, however, turns out not to be the case. Or so, at least, I will
argue. There is enough in the realists’ published works to show that much of
what “everyone knows” about them is not quite true. Part of the problem is
that much of the prevailing image of legal realism today is the legacy (the
most lasting legacy?) of critical legal scholars, who have read the realists
through a particular ideological lens. To be sure, like everyone else, I have
my own lens and it would be preposterous of me to claim to be presenting the
“view from nowhere” of legal realism. My point is that the lens is there, with
or without access to private materials.
My second methodological comment is about which of the realists’ writings to use. I will largely, although not exclusively, base my arguments on the
realists’ earlier writings, from the
s and
s. There is a tendency to
think of the realists as young angry men, who mellowed with age.69 Alternatively, it is sometimes argued that in later writings the realists retreated from
their earlier radicalism after witnessing the horrors of World War II.70 Whatever the reason, it is common to argue that in their later writings, the realists
embraced the values of liberal democracy they had previously scorned. For
this reason, it is common to treat the realists’ writings from the
s and
onwards as less representative of “true” legal realism found in the early writings. Thus, an author of a book on Jerome Frank awkwardly acknowledged
69
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that in his later writings, Frank “paid at least lip service to the importance of
legal rules.”71 Another commentator, in a book that placed the realists’ skepticism at its core (as well as in its subtitle), was incensed by the way Llewellyn himself characterized legal realism late in his career, since it “reduce[d]
a rich and vital movement to something of almost trivial importance.”72
Like other narratives of sin and redemption (or is it rise and fall?), it
makes a good story. But it rests on flimsy evidence. While it is not unheard
of for people to change their views with age and for youthful fiery energies
to calm, I think there is a tendency to exaggerate the extent to which the realists changed their tune. Generally, I find in the realists’ early writings
broadly similar views to those they expressed in later ones. There are some
changes, to be sure, but there are no ideological U-turns. Given that this is
my view, I could have used the realists’ later writings just as much as the early
ones, but this would require me to make good on claims to continuity between
early and late writings. By focusing on the realists’ earlier works, I get around
this possible challenge to my argument. I will argue that from the start the
realists were neither skeptics nor radical.

I. THE REALISTS’ UNEXPECTED HEROES
In this Part, I hope to upend many of the common understandings about the
legal realists. The strategy I employ is considering the realists’ reactions to
certain scholars, projects, and ideas that we would expect the realists to disapprove of if they were skeptics about law, but which they in fact supported.
This may look like a rather roundabout way of examining the views of the
realists. Why not examine the realists’ views more directly? In part, this is
because this article complements other works where I do exactly that.73 There
are, however, two independent reasons for the approach taken here. First, I
mentioned already the natural tendency to see our intellectual heroes as
speaking to us, if not “for the ages.” Part of being realistic about the legal
71
ROBERT JEROME GLENNON, THE ICONOCLAST AS REFORMER: JEROME FRANK’S IMPACT ON AMERICAN LAW
(
). Glennon acknowledged that Frank himself denied that
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n. .
And indeed, it is not difficult to find Frank affirming the reality and value of legal rules, even
,
(
).
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realists is recognizing that, like the rest of us, they were debating their contemporaries, engaging with the intellectual battles of their time, and responding to problems of their day.74 This does not mean that there is nothing in
what people in the past say that is relevant for us, but it does mean that to get
a sense of what the realists, we need to understand their environment, their
intellectual friends and foes. The other reason for trying to understand the
realists through their heroes is that doing so will help us get a better sense of
those figures. I will consider below the views of Arthur Corbin, Wesley
Hohfeld, and Benjamin Cardozo. Each of them has been discussed in the past
both as a legal realist and as an opponent of legal realism. Though my aim
here is not to determine who merits the label “legal realist” as though it is
some kind of honorific title, my discussion inevitably says something about
this question. If I succeed in revising perceptions about the realists, I also
make it easier to see why there is no difficulty in seeing Corbin, Hohfeld, and
Cardozo as legal realists.
A. Arthur Corbin’s Treatise
Arthur Corbin was deeply involved in the Restatement of Contract, and later
served as the Reporter for the Restatement (Second) of Contract.75 He was
opposed to the New Deal and objected to the appointment of Jerome Frank
to a professorship at Yale Law School.76 When Llewellyn was compiling his
list of legal realists, Corbin refused to be included. 77 To add to his sins,
Corbin’s scholarly work looks diametrically opposed to the standard image
of the legal realist. Corbin’s most significant scholarly achievement is his
treatise on contract law.78 Spanning eight volumes, of which one is dedicated
to a table of authorities listing tens of thousands of cases, it is not the kind of
work we would expect a legal realist to produce. Could someone like him be
considered a legal realist? For John Schlegel, the answer was clear: “Corbin
and Hohfeld were simply not Realists; their science was a doctrinal,
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analytical science and their politics, conservative.”79 Against the familiar understanding of legal realism, this answer is difficult to resist. In the standard
narrative, it was the realists who killed the legal treatise as a major scholarly
endeavor in the United States.80 Anyone whose most significant scholarly
work was a mammoth legal treatise could not have been a legal realist.
The problem with this view is that the realists themselves considered
Corbin a realist. In fact, in Some Realism about Realism Llewellyn mentioned
an essay Corbin published in
as one of the earliest examples of “the re81
alist attitude.” For someone reading this essay with today’s understanding
of legal realism in mind, this statement may seem surprising. In fact, one such
reader saw this very essay as evidence of Corbin’s alliance with Langdell.82
How could this essay be read in such divergent ways? In this essay, Corbin
acknowledged that judges make law, but this was not by any stretch a novel
point when he made it. Jeremy Bentham, not an unknown writer, spoke of
“judge-made law” well over a century earlier.83 Corbin’s more significant
point was that both descriptively and normatively judges did not make law
freely. As a descriptive matter, judges are influenced by public opinion in a
manner that tends to keep law “within hailing distance of advancing civilization.”84 Corbin thought that was good thing, for law just “represents the average of all opinions, the compromise of conflicting ideas.”85 The view underlying this sentence is law derives its authority from the people, and therefore should reflect the accepted values of the people.
In explicating this idea Corbin invoked the notion of Sittlichkeit, which
he borrowed from a then-recent address by Richard Haldane, the British Lord
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Chancellor.86 In Haldane’s words Sittlichkeit was “the system of habitual or
customary conduct, ethical rather than legal, which embraces all those obligations of the citizen which it is ‘bad form’ or ‘not the thing’ to disregard.”87
For Haldane this was the normative foundation of society, what holds it together.88 Corbin took this notion of Sittlichkeit and made it the key idea to his
account of law: “The judge, if honest, lays down either a rule that has been
approved or acquiesced in by the community in the past, or a rule to which
he believes the community will in the future give approval and acquiescence.”89 It is here, says Corbin, where one should look for the source of certainty in the law. Wherever the values and customs of the community, trade
customs and business rules are certain, so is the law; wherever they are not,
“there the law is uncertain, and uncertain it must be.”90
There is not a hint of radicalism or skepticism in this view. On the contrary, it is a rather conservative view that sees the foundation of law in the
prevailing attitudes of the majority. It does not call for dismissing legal materials: Though not sufficient for grasping a nation’s law, they contain a nation’s past legal history, which must be a guide for the future. Though not
infallible, they “contain wisdom.”91 Thus, this normative foundation of law
justifies law its authority and is also the main guide for determining its content. This view insists that the judge must be independent in the influence of
money, politicians, as well as from “the desires of small minorities,” but must
follow the Sittlichkeit.92
It is the fact that the good judge reflects the community’s sense of justice
that turns judicial reliance on intuition that might otherwise look like a bad
thing into a good one. In that case, the judge is not appealing to his subjective
value preferences, but conveying the shared values of the particular community he is a member of. This view also explains how the seemingly radical
idea of judge-made law can be domesticated, turned from a usurpation of
democracy into a means for upholding it. Indeed, to the extent that the judge
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succeeds in capturing the values of the community better than the legislature,
the common law may have greater democratic legitimacy than statutes.
It is already in this early essay that one can discern how the myth of
realist skepticism about determinate legal rules was born. The realists’ legacy
involved both a negative critique and a positive agenda. The critique was that
a particular understanding of law—where legal rules alone decide cases—is
wrong. The legal realists were indeed critical of this view, and for many this
is where the realists’ argument ended. Many have thus erroneously drawn the
mistaken conclusion that the realists dismissed legal rules altogether and
more generally were skeptical of legal authority. But Corbin’s essay suggests
that from the start the realists had a positive agenda as well, and it was one
that saw law is valuable and binding, if only we understand it differently.
Legal rules are important when understood as given meaning and constraint
by community values. As we shall see, no less than the critique, this was part
of the realist story.93
After Corbin’s early jurisprudential piece, for the rest of his career his
work focused almost exclusively on contract law, and here too there was nothing skeptical or radical about his work. One topic that Corbin wrote extensively on was contracts for the benefit of third parties, and it is a good illustration of what legal realism meant for Llewellyn. In two articles, one dedicated to American law and the other to English law, Corbin sought to show
that despite judicial and academic statements to the contrary, such contracts
were recognized by the common law under different guises.94 Formally, no
such contracts were recognized, because such contracts were inconsistent
with the foundational doctrine of privity, which insisted that only the parties
to the contract could enforce rights and obligations arising from the contract.
The doctrine rests on the sound idea that people should not be allowed to
change the rights and obligations of those not party to the contract and who
had no control over its design. Corbin argued that this modest and reasonable
idea had “bec[o]me a fetish,” which often led to unjust results according to
the existing mores of the society.95 Sensing this injustice, courts developed
workarounds. Though they did not think it was within their powers to launch
a direct attack on the doctrine of privity, Corbin argued that courts came up
93
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with creative solutions that functioned as near equivalents to contracts for the
benefit of third parties.
In the course of his discussion, Corbin made three important points.
First, it did not matter whether these doctrinal solutions fit some grand theory
of contracts; to be justified, all these decisions needed was to match the prevailing moral sense. The normative justification for contract law, just like all
other law, is its acceptability by the community and correspondence with its
underlying values. Second, Corbin made the positive point that when social
need called for it, the “living law” adapted to it by developing functionally
equivalent doctrines to contracts for the benefit of third parties. The message
was that to know the law meant looking beyond oft-repeated general statements (“contract law does not allow for contracts for the benefits of third
parties”) and consider what courts actually did.96 Third, Corbin also argued
that to know what legal rights we must look to the remedies the law provides.
If the law grants a remedy to someone outside the contract, then for all practical purposes, she has a legal right.97
These ideas would later become staples of realist thinking,98 and not one
of them is remotely skeptical. None of them implies we should ignore legal
doctrine, that legal rules don’t exist, that law is deeply indeterminate, or that
judges are more-or-less free to decide cases any way they wanted. On the
contrary, Corbin’s point was that a realistic view of the law calls for far closer
attention to court decisoins, because only in this way one can discover the
actual legal rules and legal rights in operation.99 These rules are “real” in the
sense that they formed relatively clear and predictable patterns that people
can use as guides for action. Corbin’s target was thus not legal rules, but grand
statements about the law, which were often repeated like mantras even when
they no longer matched a changing practice. More philosophically, he was
attacking the idea that legal rules must fit some grand theoretical scheme. The
law was not random, but in the end, it needed to work for the people who
used it, not the other way around. It is these ideas that made Llewellyn consider Corbin an important legal realist.
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Corbin and Llewellyn were so close to each other they referred to each
other as “dad” and “son,”100 so to call their relationship intimate is something
of an understatement. This makes it impossible to argue that Llewellyn did
not know Corbin or his views; it also means that Llewellyn’s judgment on his
mentor’s work may have been clouded by personal affection. Llewellyn,
however, is not alone among the realists who admired Corbin. After Corbin’s
eight-volume treatise on contract was published in
, 101 the Yale Law
Journal divided the task of reviewing it among seven commentators, which
included legal realists Jerome Frank, Edwin Patterson, Charles Clark, and
Harold Havighurst.102 Book reviews can be a tricky endeavor, particularly in
a small academic community when reviewer and reviewed author know each
other.103 One gets the sense that the little symposium was organized more as
an occasion for celebrating the conclusion of a mammoth project by one of
Yale’s most illustrious professors than as an attempt at real critical engagement with his ideas. The reviewers were probably carefully chosen and understood what kind of pieces they were expected to produce.104 Nonetheless,
these reviews are still revealing. What stands out even more than the uncommon praise these authors heaped on Corbin, was the explanation given for it.
Many of the reviewers thought Corbin’s doctrinal treatise was so significant
because it was a superb example of legal-realist scholarship. This is most
evident in Havighurst’s review:
[Corbin] recognizes the realities of the judicial process, the non-legal elements
that often share in producing a given decision, the pragmatic development of
100
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doctrine, often in curious ways, somehow to make possible results that square
with. life and yet do not break with a traditional rule that has served its day but
has not quite ceased to be. He does not, as many scholars do, insist that there is
only one correct meaning for every legal term. For him all generalizations are
tentative working rules; courts are human; and facts, not legal doctrines, play
the major role in judicial decision.105

These methods, Havighurst added, “embody many of the tenets of the
movement we have come to know as legal realism.” He went on to qualify
his assessment in that the book presents a simpler statement of the law than
some writers who “broaden the scope of the relevant inquiry.”106 But still
concluded that the book reflected “the spirit of modern legal thought.”107
Others made related points. For Clark, the aspect of Corbin’s work that
stood out was the “common sense and practicality” with which he approached
the topic of remedies, something he considered “a model for all teachers of
substantive law to follow.”108 Many of the reviewers pointed out that Corbin
rejected the view that rules decide cases deductively and was sensitive to the
“partly rational and partly intuitive process of evaluation.”109 That should not
lead to a skeptical or radical conclusion. As Frank explained, legal rules are
important, as they give the judge “strong hints he must never disregard,” although they should not be followed slavishly for that would lead to injustice.110 This is a far cry from any suggestion that the realists were skeptical
of the idea of legal justice, or of the possibility of achieving it.
Beyond these remarks, Corbin’s treatise is valuable for explaining the
dominant attitude among legal realists to legal doctrine. These realists did not
think Corbin filled thousands of pages with discussions of tens of thousands
of cases all in order to show that doctrine was contradictory, oppressive, or
meaningless. What made Corbin a realist was that, as Llewellyn put it in a
different context, “Corbin…never lets go of the cases” but uses them “to tear
down or challenge over-statements” of “flat and absolute pseudo-rules.”111
Rather than trying to fit the cases into a preconceived schema and dismissing
the cases that did not fit as mistakes, Corbin let the cases lead. The result was
105
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less perfectly coherent, perhaps less aesthetic than what one found in other
treatises, but for precisely this reason Corbin’s work was, well, more realistic. 112 Law emerges from this view looking less like perfectly conceived
scheme of rules, and more a series of local solutions to problems. These solutions may not fit a single philosophical theory, but then so what? The same
is true of our lives, and especially common-sense morality. Laws have their
authority over us because they are molded from our lives, so we should not
expect more—we should not want more—from them.
B. Wesley Hohfeld’s Analytics
Even more than with Corbin, certain assumptions about the realists have influenced the way people have read Wesley Hohfeld. Hohfeld achieved posterity with his enormously influential analysis of legal rights. Hohfeld
showed that the term “right” is multiply ambiguous, and—more importantly—presented in diagrammatic form an analysis of the logical relations among its different senses. 113 Especially in CLS commentary on
Hohfeld’s work, there is a sense that something like the following syllogism
at play: The realists were radicals; Hohfeld was admired by the realists; to
earn their admiration, Hohfeld must have been a realist and therefore a radical
as well. Without something like this thought in the background, it is difficult
to understand the lengths to which some critical scholars have gone to find in
Hohfeld’s work the radicalism they attribute to the realists. Consequently,
their treatment of Hohfeld has a hint of Leo Strauss’s esoteric readings of the
works of great thinkers of the past.114 Read Hohfeld superficially, they suggest, and he looks like a purely analytic and apolitical scholar, precisely the
kind of legal scholar that the dominant narrative tells us the realists railed
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against. Read between the lines, and a secret Hohfeld emerges, one who surreptitiously dismantled the received wisdom of his day.115
In a representative piece of the genre, Joseph Singer argued that
Hohfeld’s supposed radicalism consisted of recognizing that not all instances
of causing loss to others are actionable, because the law requires a showing
of a wrong.116 Though this is something that Hohfeld discussed only very
briefly, Singer put the wrong–loss distinction at the heart of Hohfeld’s work,
and then further considered it to be a radical idea that upset mainstream common-law thought. The fundamental problem with Singer’s argument is that
he takes the distinction between wrongs and losses to be a late nineteenthcentury development, and as such, a contested and challenging idea when
Hohfeld stated it. 117 In reality, the distinction appears in fifteenth-century
cases and was discussed in eighteenth century legal texts. There is nothing
remotely radical about it.118
Others find Hohfeld’s radicalism in showing that the determination of
what counts as a wrong is a matter of policy, not logic.119 I do not think this
idea is found in Hohfeld’s work, but even assuming it is, it was far from new
when it appeared: Oliver Wendell Holmes made it in a well-known article he
published a couple of decades earlier.120 As Holmes was probably the most
famous lawyer in the United States at the time, it is hard to see how reiterating
his view could be seen as a major intellectual innovation. (It also takes some
effort to see Holmes as the purveyor of left-wing radicalism.)
Horwitz more loosely suggests that Hohfeld’s analytic framework gave
the legal realists the terminology and analytical tools necessary for
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articulating their critique of legal orthodoxy.121 But this assumes that the realists were radicals themselves, which this precisely what this Article disputes. Even if it were true, this radicalism-by-association would be no more
persuasive than the claim that mathematics is politically conservative because
it was used by some conservative economists’ models.
A straightforward ground for doubting the view of Hohfeld was a secret
radical is reading his own words. Hohfeld saw the value of analytical jurisprudence in its power to provide “an accurate and intimate understanding of
the fundamental working conceptions of all legal reasoning.”122 He added
that this could help provide a better organization of the law’s different
branches “considered as an integral, harmonious and symmetrical body of
doctrine.”123 Not quite the words of someone out to deconstruct legal doctrine
and uncover its internal contradictions. After declaring himself one of the
“greater adherent[s]” of stare decisis, because of the utmost significance he
placed in “uniformity, equality, stability, certainty and knowability of the
law,”124 Hohfeld stated that his aim was “to bring order out of chaos and develop something like a real system out of our present conglomerate of judicial
precedents and piecemeal statutes.”125 Critical scholars searching for quotes
of the “classical legal thought” that the legal realists supposedly destroyed,
would have had a hard time finding better specimens.
Given all this, denying the minor premise of the syllogism may appear
more attractive: Hohfeld was not a legal realist; he was an analytical scholar,
politically neutral, or possibly even a conservative. This, as we have seen,
was Schlegel’s view, and more recently others advanced it as well.126 Proponents of this view accept that the characterization of the legal realists as jurisprudentially, and possibly also politically, radical. Not finding a hint of
radicalism in Hohfeld, they scratch his name off the walls of the realist pantheon. Though this solves the problem at one end, it creates a problem at the
other, for it cannot explain why the realists thought so highly of Hohfeld. It
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is not easy to dismiss all this as a misunderstanding of his ideas,127 since some
of Hohfeld’s greatest realist champions (Cook and Llewellyn, as well as
Corbin) knew him personally.128
I propose a different solution to the puzzle. It recognizes that many of
the legal realists found Hohfeld’s work illuminating and valuable, and it uses
this fact to rethink what our views about them: The realists appreciated
Hohfeld’s work because they were not the legal skeptics they are often portrayed as. Of course, just as I criticized above the attempts at radicalism-byassociation, it would be wrong to infer the opposite. It is possible that the
realists used Hohfeld’s purely analytic studies for radical ends he did not envision or may have even opposed. But when we look at what the realists said
when discussing Hohfeld’s work, we just don’t find this. On the contrary,
their remarks provide further support for rejecting the major premise of the
syllogism: the realists were not jurisprudentially radical. They accepted and
respected legal doctrine and found Hohfeld’s analysis valuable precisely because it helped make better sense of it. It turns out that if Hohfeld was indeed
a secret radical, he hid it so well that the legal realists missed it.
In a short entry on Hohfeld in the Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, Llewellyn explained Hohfeld’s significance: Others have analyzed rights before,
he said, but “it remained for Hohfeld to turn into an everyday working tool
what had been a plaything of jurisprudence.”129 Llewellyn further elaborated
the “pragmatic value” of Hohfeld’s work:
While it can obviously solve no cases, [Hohfeld’s analysis] makes for clarification and cuts very close to the atomic structure of the law on its conceptual
side. It was a happy accident that the same thinkers who from
to
were
influenced by Hohfeld were influenced also by Holmes’ realism and by the
pragmatic synthesizing approach of modern science.130
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some agenda of deconstructing the hidden foundations of the law, is why he
found Hohfeld’s analysis so useful. It brought clarity to an otherwise muddled
concept like “right” and could thus be used to clarify many legal doctrines.132
For the legal realists with a scientific orientation, there was a slightly
different reason to be excited about Hohfeld’s analysis. For them, his work
showed the possibility of developing a quasi-scientific analysis of legal concepts, exhibiting the rigor and precision found in mathematics and of the natural sciences. Citing Hohfeld, Cook spoke of “the absolute necessity for both
an exact, scientific analysis of fundamental legal conceptions and an equally
exact and scientific terminology.”133 Just as science relied on logic and mathematics, the empirical science of law needed its precise and well-defined
building blocks. Hohfeld’s work was thus a tool, “a means to an end—the
solution of legal problems and the development of our law so as to meet the
human needs which are the sole reasons for its existence.”134 Thus, for scientific legal realists, Hohfeld’s analysis, like the rest of the law, was valuable
because it was a means to improving life. All this presupposes, of course, that
law is, or at least can be made, determinate and properly designed for the
promotion of concrete ends.
Though Hohfeld’s analysis of legal relations is the main reason why the
realists read and admired him, some of them also appreciated him for ideas
he spelled out in another essay, entitled A Vital School of Jurisprudence and
Law,135 sketching out his vision for what a proper law school should look
like. There is magisterial grandeur to this piece that is lacking from Hohfeld’s
dense and technical analytical studies of legal relations. In this essay, Hohfeld
analogized the university study of law to the study of the natural sciences,
although not so much in terms of adopting their methods. Instead, Hohfeld
identified law, along with science, as one of the great pillars of human civilization; he considered law specifically as an institution dedicated to the
132
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betterment of humanity. Against the backdrop of the Great War waging in
Europe at the time, the essay’s concluding paragraphs spoke of the need to
develop the “spirit of legalism among the masses at large” as a necessary step
for the development of international law as “the only substitute for war.”136
In this vein, Hohfeld advocated for “the fundamental, conservative and permanent betterment of our legal institutions.”137 It is this optimistic vision—
sharply at odds with the pessimistic and even angry tone of so much CLS
scholarship, which often described law as a tool of oppression—that many
legal realists rallied behind.138 Moreover, despite advocating for more interdisciplinary approaches to the study of law, Hohfeld did not think that lawyers should turn to economists or moral philosophers for normative guidance.
Hohfeld’s view of law was that at bottom it should reflect the prevailing attitudes in society.139 Beyond the clarificatory value of his analysis of rights,
this idea, which many legal realists shared with him, is another reason why
so many of them found his work congenial.
C. Thomas Scrutton’s Commercial Sense
Karl Llewellyn was a colorful character of with some eccentric habits and
unusual passions. One of them, by no means the strangest, was his unbridled
admiration for Thomas E. Scrutton. I suspect most readers of this article, especially if they are American, will stare blankly at this name and wonder,
“Who was he?” Scrutton was an English judge who specialized in commercial law. Despite considerable reputation for brilliance, for remembering
every case he had ever read, and for knowing the facts of cases he adjudicated
better than the lawyers arguing before him, he was never elevated to the
House of Lords. One reason seems to have been that he was something of a
curmudgeon: cutting, critical, and often cynical. When he thought someone—
witness, lawyer, or even a more senior judge—was lacking in intelligence, he
did not keep his opinion a secret.140
Llewellyn considered Scrutton “the greatest English-speaking commercial judge of a century,” and in his list of all-time greats ranked him higher
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than another one of his judicial heroes, Lord Mansfield.141 Llewellyn opened
one of his articles with three-page encomium to Scrutton, saying that he was
not just “a matchless commercial lawyer” but also an “oak. Uncompromising,
sturdy, straight-directed, earth-grown, as an ex-hewn oaken roof-tree.” He
added that whenever he sent a student to read any of Scrutton’s decisions, the
student came back “bubbling—and dreaming of a trip to England, and to that
man,” a dream that Llewellyn admitted to having as well.142 Even Scrutton’s
reputation for being difficult received from Llewellyn a positive spin: “He
saw so clearly. They did not.”143 It was not Scrutton’s fault for losing patience
with the mediocrities surrounding him.
Scrutton is valuable for the present discussion because for Llewellyn,
Scrutton was the ultimate realist judge. What impressed Llewellyn most
about Scrutton’s judicial opinions was not stylistic flair, nor was it interdisciplinary forays into philosophy or economics. It was definitely not any sign of
political radicalism or seat-of-the-pants intuitionism. For Llewellyn, Scrutton
was the ideal commercial law judge because he understood the world of commerce and considered it his role as a judge to facilitate business. He succeeded in his role because he had a sense of the expectations and needs of
businesspeople and how to shape legal doctrine to help them.144
This focus on the needs of business, which Llewellyn shared with
Scrutton and was the touchstone for his work on the Uniform Commercial
Code,145 is yet another indication that promoting radical left-wing politics
was not quite a central concern for many leading legal realists. As for
141
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,
,
– (
) [hereinafter Llewellyn, Warranty]; see also Karl Nickerson Llewellyn, From the Point of View of the Economist and Business Man, PROC. ACAD. POL. &
(
) [hereinafter Llewellyn, Point of View].
SOC. SCI. CITY N.Y. ,
142
See Llewellyn, Warranty, supra note , at
. It apparently never happened, although the two corresponded. In January
(i.e., at the height of his supposedly most critical period), Llewellyn was instrumental in inviting Scrutton to deliver a series of lectures at
, at
. Citing his age, Scrutton declined.
Columbia. See FOXTON, supra note
143
See Llewellyn, Warranty, supra note
, at
– ; see also K.N. Llewellyn,
,
n.* (
); cf. Lon
Through Title to Contract and a Bit Beyond, N.Y.U. L.Q. REV.
,
L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart, HARV. L. REV.
(
) (remarking on an “imaginary Scrutton” who “has the misfortune…to live under
a supreme court which he considers woefully ignorant of the ways and needs of commerce”).
144
FOXTON, supra note
, at
– ,
– ,
– ,
; Llewellyn, Point of View,
supra note
, at
. By contrast, attempts to fit Scrutton into the mythical, present-day
understandings of legal realism do not succeed. See Andrew Phang, A Legal Giant Revisited—Thomas Edward Scrutton and the Development of English Commercial Law,
J.
– (
) (reviewing FOXTON, supra note
).
CONTRACT L. ,
145
See TWINING, supra note
, at
(reproducing an address Llewellyn gave in
, in which Llewellyn said his aim was to create law that businesspeople would not see
as complex and confusing but “as a helpful device”). For more on this see Part II.D, infra.
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jurisprudential radicalism, anyone coming to Scrutton’s opinions with today’s
understanding of legal realism will expect him to be an extreme intuitionist,
someone who ignored past cases, or treated them in a way that showed he had
no real respect for legal doctrine. This is not at all what one finds. On and off
the bench, Scrutton distanced himself from “that vague jurisprudence which
is sometimes attractively styled ‘justice as between man and man.’” 146
Scrutton’s biographer, after a careful examination of his judgments, concluded that he was not a “caricature realist”: He cared for the development of
legal principles, and was critical of the idea of “decid[ing] each case as you
think right without regard to principled laid down in previous similar
cases.”147 When he found himself in disagreement with a higher court, he explained in detail his reasons, but then dutifully followed precedent.148 This
was Llewellyn’s judicial idol.
D. E Pluribus Unum: The Restatements and the Uniform Commercial Code
In the familiar mythology on the legal realists, the Restatements hold a special place. In a narrative of Good versus Evil, the American Law Institute and
its Restatements are designated the forces of darkness, a reactionary attempt
to keep alive the false ideas from which the realists came to save us. Resorting
to necromantic imagery, Lawrence Friedman once wrote of those involved in
the Restatements, that they “took fields of living law, scalded their flesh,
drained off the blood, and reduced them to bones.”149 If there was a “theory
of sorts” underlying their efforts, it was that “[a] legal order [that] is clear,
orderly, systemic (in its formal parts), which has the most structural
beauty…is also the best and the most efficient.”150
146

Holt v. Markham, [
] K.B.
,
(C.A.
); see also T.E. Scrutton, The
) (“We are not trying to do
Work of the Commercial Courts, CAMBRIDGE L.J. , (
justice, if you mean by justice some moral standard which is not the law of England”); but
cf. Llewellyn, Warranty, supra note , at
n. (assuring us that his hero cared about
justice).
147
See FOXTON, supra note
, at
– (quoting Hill v. Aldershot Corp., [
]
K.B.
,
(C.A. (Eng.)).
148
See id. at
(discussing Hillas v. Arcos,
Lloyd’s L. Rep.
(C.A. (Eng.)
)). Incidentally, someone else who acted in a similar fashion is Judge Jerome Frank. See
GLENNON, supra note , at – .
149
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN Law
(
) [hereinafter
)]; accord WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE LOST WORLD OF CLASSICAL
FRIEDMAN, HISTORY (
LEGAL THOUGHT: LAW AND IDEOLOGY IN AMERICA,
–
, at
(
) (for the realists
the Restatements were “a futile yet dangerous attempt to mummify legal doctrine and impose
it as the central ordering project of American law”).
150
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW
– ( d ed.
). It
seems that with every successive edition of his book, Friedman has tempered his criticism of
the Restatements. The latest one still contains some critical remarks, but its tone is far milder.
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Such imagery makes the realists’ bitter opposition to the Restatement all
but inevitable. As “living law” was something of a realist mantra,151 it is obvious why they would oppose these attempts at legal mummification. Furthermore, as skeptics about legal rules and their role in deciding cases, they
would have nothing positive to say about a project dedicated to “restating”
the common law in the form of blackletter rules. At best, this was a waste of
time; more likely, it was worse, the killing of a thriving area of law.
This is indeed what one finds in histories of legal realism.152 In Laura
Kalman’s telling the Restatements project was “the final effort to realize
Langdell’s ideal of a science of law.”153 And as in her account Langdell stands
for her everything the realists hated—formalism, conservatism, Harvard—
Kalman argued that the realists “vociferously” opposed the Restatements.154
She conceded that Corbin, who is central to her narrative of the rise of legal
realism at Yale, was part of the team that worked on the Restatement of Contract, but she considers him an outlier. The realists’ “skepticism about legal
rules, doctrines, and certainty ensured that most realists would be less supportive than Corbin.”155 For Edward White, the Restatements reveal the fault
line between sociological jurists of an older generation (such as Pound and
Cardozo) who supported them, and the younger legal realists who feared they
would stifle serious legal reform. Like Kalman, White argued that the Restatements were premised on a view of law and legal rules that was at odds
with the realists’ skeptical credo: The Realists saw the Restatements, “as symbols of nineteenth-century conceptualism.”156
See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW
– ( th ed.
) [here)].
inafter FRIEDMAN, HISTORY (
151
See, e.g., Walton H. Hamilton, The Living Law,
SURVEY GRAPHIC
(
);
).
K.N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, COLUM. L. REV. , (
152
Probably the first to contrast legal realism with the Restatements was Grant Gil); Grant Gilmore, Legal Remore. See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (
,
– (
) [hereinafter Gilmore, Legal
alism: Its Cause and Cure,
YALE L.J.
Realism].
153
KALMAN, supra note , at , ; see also FRIEDMAN, HISTORY (
), supra note
, at
(the Restatements were “perhaps the high-water mark of conceptual jurisprudence”).
154
See KALMAN, supra note , at ,
nn. – .
155
Id. at .
156
G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY
(expanded ed.
); White, supra note , at (“Realist scholars used the appearance of the
Restatements to expand their critique of the coherence of rules themselves”). For a small
(“the Restatement movesampling of similar statements see FELDMAN, supra note , at
ment can be understood as a Langdellian reactionary response to realism”); JUSTIN ZAREMBY, LEGAL REALISM AND AMERICAN LAW
,
(
); DUXBURY, supra note , at
; Schlegel, supra note , at ; see also note
, infra.
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More than just affirming the familiar story of the realists as opponents
of legal doctrine and skeptics about legal rules, this narrative dramatizes it
into a set-piece of young versus old, radical outsiders versus conservative
establishment, Yale versus Harvard. Once again, however, too many overlooked facts do not fit this neat narrative. Faced with an ever-growing mass
of law reports, far greater than anything found in any other common law
country, there was a sense among the leaders of the American legal profession
and prominent legal academics that American common law was becoming
impossible to master; there was simply too much of it. There was also the
related worry that with each state developing its own jurisprudence, the formerly unified common law was getting too divergent and fragmented. All this
threatening making legal research and legal education impossible. Explicitly
drawing on Hohfeld’s call for a “conservative and permanent betterment of
our legal institutions,” the A.L.I. was founded in
with the aim of bringing about greater clarity and uniformity in the law by issuing general “restatements” of various areas of law.157
When that happened, many of the scholars who would later be called
legal realists wrote in support of the new project; and some got involved.
Walter Wheeler Cook published a friendly comment on the A.L.I. in The New
Republic;158 Llewellyn and Herman Oliphant did the same in a less conspicuous venue. Both noted the enormity and difficulty of the project but were
clearly supportive.159 Hessel Yntema published two articles dedicated to the
A.L.I., both praising its mission of providing a clearer and more unified account of American law.160 In one of them, he called the creation of the A.L.I.
“one of the most hopeful events in the recent legal history of this country.”161
Though he noted some problems with the Restatement project, he concluded
157

See Foreword to A.L.I. PROC. pt. , at , (quoting Hohfeld, supra note
, at
). Beyond this programmatic statement, Hohfeld’s analysis of rights was also used, in
varying degrees, in the work on the Restatements. See George R. Farnum, Terminology and
,
– (
).
the American Law Institute, B.U. L. REV.
158
Walter Wheeler Cook, The American Law Institute, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. ,
,
at .
159
See Herman Oliphant, The Problem of Logical Methods, from the Lawyer’s Point
,
(
); Llewellyn, Point of View,
of View,
PROC. ACAD. POL. SCI. CITY N.Y.
(praising the A.L.I. for
supra note
, at
; see also LLEWELLYN, supra note , at
improving respect for legal academics’ work).
160
See Yntema, supra note
, at
,
– ; Hessel E. Yntema, What Should the
(
) [hereinafter Yntema, What]. In a
American Law Institute Do?,
MICH. L. REV.
later essay, he described the Restatements as a “great enterprise, the first comprehensive and
sustained effort, co-ordinating the best minds on the bench, among the bar, and in the law
schools, to codify the unwritten Common Law.” Hessel E. Yntema, The Jurisprudence of
,
(A. Reppy ed.,
).
Codification, in DAVID DUDLEY FIELD: CENTENARY ESSAYS
161
Yntema, What, supra note
, at
.
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that those were a “healthy symptom” of the valuable work being done,
namely that “the decisions in particular states…are being studied with a care
and on a scale not hitherto envisaged.” For this reason alone, he said, the
Restatements project was “abundantly justified.”162 Not only was Yntema not
critical of the Restatements, he wanted to see the project expanded to cover
legal procedure, the administration of justice, and statutory law.163
Realist support went beyond cheering from the sidelines. As mentioned
earlier, Corbin was deeply involved in the Restatement of Contract from the
start, and initially Oliphant was too (although he left the project after two
years);164 Joseph Bingham was part of the team that produced the Restatement of Conflict of Laws.165 As detailed below, other legal realists were part
of the drafting teams of various Restatements, and still others were life members of the A.L.I.166 After adding up all these names, it seems easier to name
those realists who had no connections with it.
It is worth reviewing some of this involvement in the Restatements, both
to bolster my claim that most of the realists supported the project, but also to
demonstrate how the narrative of realists-versus-Restaters has been constructed for the sake of brandishing the radical reputation of the realists. For
a start, take the case of Francis Bohlen. Though not part of Llewellyn’s published list of realists, he was at least realist adjacent: Llewellyn’s drafts and
correspondence preceding the publication of Some Realism about Realism
show that he considered Bohlen for inclusion in the list of legal realists.167
And with good reason, as Bohlen was sympathetic to the realists’ ideas: When
Jerome Frank published Law and the Modern Mind, the book generated controversy and some hostile reactions,168 but not from Bohlen. He reviewed
162

See Yntema, supra note
, at
.
Yntema, What, supra note
, at
,
.
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See Corbin, Restatement, supra note , at
.
165
See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, at iii (Am. Law Inst.
).
Bingham, one of the scientific legal realists, used an analogy with the natural sciences to
explain the importance of articulating law’s conceptual apparatus: “Should a natural scientist
contemptuously banish algebra from his workshop? Of course not. Then why should a jurist
consign all the painfully devised systematic logic of his profession to the limbo of futilities?”
Valid criticisms of this “traditional legal logic,” he added, should not detract from “just appreciation of its purport.” Joseph W. Bingham, The American Law Institute vs. The Supreme
,
– n. (
).
Court: In the Matter of Haddock v. Haddock, CORNELL L.Q.
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See, e.g., ALI Proc. at
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(
) (listing Joseph Bingham, Leon Green, Ernest Lorenzen, Charles Clark, Herman Oliphant, Walter Wheeler Cook, Thomas Swan, as well
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notes
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, and accompanying text.
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Frank’s book enthusiastically and urged all lawyers to read it. He praised
Frank for “prov[ing] to the hilt” that there are no eternal and immutable legal
principles, a view Bohlen said was still widely accepted.169 A few years later,
in an article revealingly entitled The Reality of What the Courts Are Doing,
Bohlen unreservedly embraced realist critiques of “‘Bealeistic’ conceptualism.”170 He concluded his essay with boilerplate realism: “when the need
arises, [judges should] tell the real reasons for their decisions and not conceal
them beneath legalistic and often meaningless phrases.” 171 All the while,
Bohlen was also the Reporter for the Restatement of the Law of Torts.172
By now, such a combination of views need not appear surprising: The
legal realists did not dismiss legal doctrine as chimera, nor did they object to
attempts to clarifying or improving it. Bohlen pointed out that to ignore “[t]he
desire for symmetry, for consistency” is something that judges strive for,
which is why “it is the reverse of ‘realism’ to exaggerate the field in which
[judicial] judgment or ‘hunch’ operates.”173 If one takes seriously that judges
are human, then—no more, but also no less, than other humans—they may
seek order and symmetry in the field they are working in. Put differently, just
as there were “formalist” law professors, there are formalist judges, who will
seek to shape the law in light of their ideas. A “realistic” legal education that
aims to teach future practitioners how to construct and present winning legal
arguments, would do a disservice to its students if it ignored the existence of
such judges.174 Realism about an object does not mean chaos unless the object described is chaotic. And of course, even if law is disorganized, there is
nothing unrealistic in wanting to make it less so.
Bohlen’s reference to hunches was an allusion to Judge Joseph Hutcheson’s provocative article which extolled the role of intuition in
169
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adjudication. 175 Some of what Hutcheson said in that article sounded as
though he arrived at his decision through a process of mystical divination,
which not even he could explain. Such an account did not seem to have much
room in it for the influence of legal rules. This one-hit wonder was enough to
earn Hutcheson a place in Llewellyn’s list of realists and guarantee for him a
supporting role in the realist firmament. Possibly more than any other realist
work, Hutcheson’s article seems to support the view that the realists were
skeptical of legal rules or their role in legal reasoning. If what decides cases
are gut feelings, then the legal reasons provided in written decisions look like
after-the-fact rationalizations, which suggests that legal rules have very little
influence on the outcomes of cases. If there is anyone who would criticize the
Restatements as a useless waste of time and effort, surely it would be Hutcheson.
Except he didn’t. In a short essay on the A.L.I. and its work, Hutcheson
wrote that “[t]he Restatement gives that which we have never had before, a
reasonably authoritative expression of the present law.”176 He acknowledged
that he thought “judges must have a reasonable freedom of decisions, and
liberty of choice as between one suggested rule and another,” but he still considered the Restatement “an inestimable value to us all.” He reiterated his
faith in the power of the judicial hunch for its ability to show the path for the
law to follow, the Restatement “give[s] us firm starting points for new departures.”177 Hutcheson drew the standard distinction between cases where “the
decided law has already gone along [a certain] way” and acknowledged that
in such cases the Restatement can relieve the judge “from resorting to [the
‘little small dice’ of intuition].”178 It is only in the “really unprovided cases,”
that judges need to turn to intuition, and the Restatement provides guidance
for these cases as well.179

175

See Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the “Hunch”
(
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in Judicial Decision, CORNELL L.Q.
essay’s message is more moderate than it is often taken to be. This is, of course, consistent
with the argument of this article, and helps explain Hutcheson’s views discussed below.
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THE LAW OF TORTS, at iii (Am. Law Inst.
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, at
.
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)).
Small Dice, TUL. L. REV. (
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Id. Incidentally, Llewellyn once wrote that having “studied Judge Hutcheson’s
opinions long and hard” he found them to “run with gratifying and even uplifting consistency,” and that they were no less predictable than those of other judges. See Llewellyn,
supra note , at
– . Not only were consistency and predictability possible, Llewellyn
considered them desirable and was gratified to find them in unexpected places.
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It is true that when the Restatements began to be published, some of the
realists were not entirely happy with the results. It would be incredible if that
were not so. The Restatements were a new genre of legal writing: an attempt
to cover whole areas of the common law in the form of a code which was not
quite a code. Each Restatement was a significant undertaking spanning hundreds of pages, the joint enterprise of many people, themselves trying to synthesize the law of dozens of related but independent jurisdictions. Inevitably,
to achieve any kind of result necessitated compromise; inevitably, the final
product could not perfectly match the views of any academic who formed
some views about “his” subject. Anyone who expects anything other than
disagreement has not paid enough attention to what happens in their faculty
workshop.180
It is thus completely predictable that when the individual Restatements
were completed and published, some legal realists had grave disagreements
with the result.181 However, in the rush to depict the realists as opponents of
the whole project due to its “conceptualist” ideology, commentators have often missed this point. It is one thing to welcome the idea behind the Restatements and be disappointed with the results; it is quite another to think that the
project is fundamentally flawed from the start. It is only critiques of the second kind that fit the narrative of the realists’ skepticism, but in reality most
realists’ critical remarks on the Restatement were resolutely of the first kind.
In fact, many times these criticisms turn out to be the opposite of what one
would expect them to be. A frequent realist complaint about the Restatements
was that their statement of the law was inaccurate because they did not pay
sufficient attention to legal materials.
One kind of criticism came from the more scientifically oriented realists
and was in accordance with their naturalistic outlook. To use modern parlance, they wanted the Restatements to be more “evidence based,” they
wanted to see the Restatement take on policy questions more openly, they
hoped to see the project aided by experts from other disciplines that employ
“objective [research] methods,” and they wished to see greater use of factual
surveys.182 These criticisms were always offered as friendly amendments by
those seeking to improve on an already valuable enterprise.
180
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, infra.
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. By contrast, the traditionalist Corbin did not think there would be
much value in such data collection as social changes relevant for the Restatement would need
to be reflected in the cases first. See Corbin, Common Law, supra note , at .
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Other criticisms focused on the content of the Restatements themselves.
It is here that it is crucial to pay attention to the distinction between two kinds
of criticism mentioned above. Charles Clark’s review of the contracts Restatement is a good illustration of this point. It is especially valuable because
both Kalman and White discussed it in some detail, and both used it as an
evidence of the realists’ fundamental opposition to the Restatements and their
underlying philosophy. 183 Clark’s review was nothing of the sort. Significantly, both Kalman and White omitted from their discussion the fact, mentioned prominently in the review, that at the time of writing Clark was part of
the team working on the Restatement of Property.184 Not only that, Clark took
pains to make it clear his criticisms would not be misunderstood as denunciation of the enterprise. As he put it, rather dramatically, he had “done all in
[his] power to further the objects of the Institute,”185 chief among them “the
objective of making [as] a clear statement of existing rules of law as is possible.”186
Clark acknowledged that his criticisms of the contracts Restatement reflected a philosophical difference among members of the A.L.I., which manifested itself in disagreements over form. In line with this view, he proposed
was “a shift in emphasis,” not the abandonment of the project.187 Clark had
his doubts about organizing the material in the form of a code consisting of
numbered sections, an approach that he worried had a tendency to give an
oversimplified presentation of the law.188 This difference over form reflects a
philosophical disagreement over the proper way to design the law in order to
ensure its ability to deal with a wide range of situations and the needs of a
changing society. It reflects debates, familiar at the time, over the desirability
of codifying the common law. Long before the legal realists, opponents of
codification feared that it would stultify the vitality and organic development
of the common law.189 There is no shred of skepticism or radicalism in this
183
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Rules of Civil Procedure, which he justified in terms of the need for greater conformity. See
Charles E. Clark, The Proposed Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
A.B.A. J.
,
(
).
187
Clark, supra note
, at
,
.
188
See id. at
& n. (noting others sharing his view),
– .
189
For an example of how this debate played out in late nineteenth-century New York
see Mathias Reimann, The Historical School Against Codification: Savigny, Carter, and the
); see also Dan Priel, Conceptions
Defeat of the New York Code, AM. J. COMP. L. (

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4142277

view; if anything, the anti-codification view has more than a tinge of conservatism to it, preferring the “organic” development of the law from below
to the top-down imposition more characteristic of a legislative code.
Clark’s support for the project coupled with criticisms over execution is
representative of the reaction of many realists. What is even more surprising
is that in many cases, the realists’ criticisms go against expectations. Many of
the realists pointed out that the Restatements gave an incorrect account of the
state of legal doctrine. For example, Edwin Patterson worried that the Restatement of Contract did not distinguish clearly between those propositions
that were “well-supported by cases” and those for which “authorities are
scanty or dubious.”190 Of course, this is the kind of concern can be voiced
only by someone who believed that cases generally create solid, real, recognized legal rules, and that it is possible to draw a meaningful distinction between issues on which the law is settled and those on which it is not. All this
is very different from the suggestion that the realists’ criticisms of the project
were motivated by skepticism about legal rules themselves.
Leon Green provides another illustration. In the period that the Restatements were in still development, he wrote favorably about how helpful the
work of the American Law Institute has been “and will continue to be” for
legal scholarship and the administration of law.191 When the torts Restatement was finally published, Green reviewed it and repeated his praise for the
A.L.I., and predicted that “for centuries to come [American lawyers] will
profit by its work.”192 All this seems genuine and is consistent with his other
comments on the A.L.I. There is no denying, however, that he was deeply
dissatisfied with the torts Restatement. Part of the disagreement undoubtedly
grew out his philosophical differences about tort law with the torts
of Authority and the Anglo-American Common Law Divide,
AM. J. COMP. L.
,
(
) (highlighting the jurisprudential presuppositions of this debate).
190
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Restatement’s Reporter, Francis Bohlen.193 Once again, however, much of his
criticism is at odds with what we would expect a legal realist to say. One of
Green’s main complaints was the cumbersome and verbose language adopted
in the torts Restatement,194 not a likely critique from someone who thought
the whole endeavor of restating the law was misguided, but a very sensible
criticism if one accepts the Restatements goal of provide a clear summary of
the law. Another one of Green’s complaints, on “how little importance has
been attached to analysis and classification” in preparing the Restatement, is
likewise difficult to reconcile with the realists’ supposed skepticism about the
analysis and classification of law.195 One example Green gave was that some
of the material was organized based on the interest protected by the tort (physical integrity, property, reputation), while some material was organized
around a kind of behavior (specifically, negligence) which can infringe different kinds of interests. This is not very different from the criticism about
the taxonomy of torts made today by those who distance themselves from
legal realism in its contemporary, skeptical sense.196
The real embarrassment for those who argue for the fundamental opposition between the realists and the A.L.I. is that one of the best known and
most significant realists also led the A.L.I.’s most significant project. As
Chief Reporter of the Uniform Commercial Code from
to
, Llewellyn dedicated much of his time to drafting a model code which was developed
and published under the auspices of of the A.L.I. and the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.197
Attempts to reconcile the purported legal radicalism and rule skepticism
of the legal realists with Llewellyn’s well-known involvement in the UCC
take two forms. One approach distinguishes between two stages in Llewellyn’s work, contrasting Llewellyn’s early rebellious and critical period with
his later, more constructive work, often attributing a retreat from more radical
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(
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ideas in the aftermath of the horrors of World War II.198 But if I am right,
there was no radicalism to retreat from, because Llewellyn held a broadly
similar, constructive view throughout his career. I mentioned already that
shortly after the A.L.I. was founded in
, Llewellyn published a paper
sympathetic with the Institute and its mission. Three years later, Llewellyn
became a Commissioner of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform States Laws and held this role until the end of his life, throughout
his supposedly critical period.199 Nor is there any indication of a dramatic
change in his outlook on the law. While there are some shifts in emphasis and
changes in perspective, the non-skeptical, even slightly conservative, bent is
evident from early on. Consider one example: “Compared with other social
phenomena, the institution of judicial decision making is indeed among the
most conservative and inflexible.” This is not Langdell or Beale; this is Llewellyn from his book The Case Law System in America, published in Germany
in
and based on lectures he delivered in
– .200 To be fair, Llewellyn
contrasts there the fixity of law at wholesale with the freedom available at
retail, which is where most lawyers operate. But there is never a hint in this
book that rules don’t matter or that they can be manipulated to reach any
desired outcome, or that the outcomes of cases depend exclusively (or even
predominantly) on personal traits of the judge. A similar message emerges
from Llewellyn’s contemporaneous book, The Bramble Bush, which he used
to accompany a set of introductory lectures for first-year students.201
The other way of reconciling Llewellyn’s supposed skepticism with his
years-long work on the UCC takes the opposite approach to reconciling the
seeming conflict. It is not that Llewellyn became conservative, it is that the
Code is a jurisprudentially radical product. To achieve this conclusion, the
UCC is described as a kind of anti-code which challenges the very idea of a
code as a set of prescriptive, guiding legal rules. In one formulation of this
idea, the UCC told judges to keep doing what they were doing anyway,
198
See Hefferman, supra note , at
. More generally, on the supposed retreat from
radicalism see notes – , supra, and accompanying text. For similar reasons, I reject the
opposite suggestion made in White, supra note , at , that having lost the battle with
realism, the A.L.I. decided to join them by recruiting legal realists for the second series of
Restatements.
199
See STEIN, supra note
, at
.
200
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201
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, at
(sensible legal critique recognizes
“courts must move within the framework of the given rules. The rules, however socially
unjust they seem to him or others, still are there. The court is but their mouthpiece.”). Consider also that Llewellyn’s admiration for Scrutton, discussed in Part I.C, supra, also began
in the
s.
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namely decide according to their intuitive response for the facts of the case,
unencumbered by any legal rules.202 A somewhat different formulation of this
idea accused the UCC of normative “passivity” in following trade customs,
which the author linked to the realists’ supposed “indifference to any moral
imperative.”203 Neither claim is accurate.
There is no doubt that the UCC was shaped in light of Llewellyn’s vision—how could it not?204—and that vision departed in some ways from earlier commercial codes. But the fundamental goals of the UCC were entirely
conventional. Like the Restatements, the Uniform Commercial Code was
conceived of as a response to the felt need for greater clarity and uniformity
in the commercial law of the different states.205 In Llewellyn’s own words,
the commercial world needed “[s]impler, clearer, and better adjusted rules,
built to make sense and and to protect good faith, make for more foreseeable
and more satisfactory results both in court and out.”206 And this is precisely
what Llewellyn sought to offer: The drafters of the UCC, he said, were working on “ironing out discrepancies, filling gaps, meeting new needs” all with
the ultimate aim of “immediate usability.”207 On another occasion, Llewellyn
explained the Code’s aim both in terms of making the purpose of the law
clearer for the layperson, and in providing “to the counsel and to the court a
sharper and more predictable guidance.”208 All this indicates that Llewellyn
had a conventional understanding of what a code should do.
The UCC was conventional also in another sense. The Restatements,
though written in the form of a statute (complemented by commentary and
illustrations) were not meant to be the basis for legislation. By contrast, from
its inception the UCC was designed as a model code to be enacted across the
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United States.209 In this, the UCC was conceived of as an update of the earlier
Uniform Sales Act, which was largely the work of Samuel Williston, the
Langdellian contract scholar from Harvard.
As for the Code’s underlying normative message, it neither reflects indifference to moral questions, nor does it tell judges to just so what they have
been doing all along. Its underlying normative guideline is for judges to decide cases according to the prevailing values of the community. It is what
Llewellyn called “lawyer’s Natural Law,” premised on the idea that “[g]uidance for a particular society must plant its feet in that society.”210 This is the
same Sittlichkeit that Corbin endorsed in the essay Llewellyn considered a
foundational piece of legal realism,211 and a view that Llewellyn used to draw
a link between American common law (in the grand style) and American democracy.212
For Llewellyn, what this meant for commercial law, his main area of
interest, was trying to identify the commercial practices and values of businesspeople, in order to align commercial law with prevailing commercial
standards.213 If all judges had been like Scrutton, Llewellyn’s judicial idol,
the UCC might not have been needed. But judges as informed of, and sensitive to, the needs and expectations of business were few and far between. For
the more commonplace judges, there was a need for a commercial code that
would tell them, or force them to learn about and then apply, the norms of the
business community.214 The Code thus did have a normative agenda of facilitating the needs and expectations of business by creating institutional mechanisms that would incorporate them into the law.
There are many possible criticisms of this view, starting with the idea
that commercial law should be developed based on the idea of facilitating
209

The creation of a uniform law across the United States is one of its stated guiding
). This aim
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business. Even accepting it, some have questioned the means by which Llewellyn has sought to bring it about, either on factual grounds (there are no stable trade customs) or normative ones (businesspeople may follow certain
rules during an ongoing business relationship but will want different, formal
rules to deal with commercial conflict).215 Whatever their merits, these criticisms all presuppose that Llewellyn had a wholly traditional normative vision, which he tried to imbue into a wholly traditional legal instrument, a
legal code.
To conclude the discussion so far, I have argued that contrary to the familiar narrative, the majority of the realists were supportive of the Restatements. Even when critical about the execution, the criticism is not based on
skepticism about legal rules. I must acknowledge that this overwhelming support for the Restatements and the UCC was not shared by all legal realists. A
small minority objected, not coincidentally consisting almost entirely of the
few legal realists who were hostile to the common law and wanted to see it
replaced by the methods of modern natural science.216 Since the Restatement
were not an attempt to reform the law with the aid of the methods of the
natural sciences, these realists saw them as a misguided enterprise that seeks
to perpetuate lawyers’ outdated methods and the products of these methods.
In line with these criticism, Felix Cohen described the Restatements as “the
last-drawn-out gasp of a dying tradition,” which was adamant on keeping
alive “the dogmas of legal theology.”217 These legal realists did not share the
more traditionalist legal realists’ admiration for the common law as reflecting
community values; for this reason, they did not consider valuable the exercise
of putting the mass of common law cases into a coherent system. True legal
reform had to be grounded in finding the needs of society by way of formulating and testing empirical hypotheses. It is not too far to suggest that from
this perspective, the Restatements may be seen as worse than nothing, because they stood in the way of real (i.e., scientific) law reform.218
215
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These ideas received their sharpest expression in an essay by Thurman
Arnold.219 Arnold drew a distinction between the insiders “priests” who participate in the theology of law and outsider “observers” who assume a social
scientific stance toward the practice.220 Though the Restatements were a sincere effort by dedicated insiders, Arnold argued they were blinded by their
own perspective from seeing both how their efforts made the problem worse,
and that another way was possible. Arnold acknowledged that from the inside, the Restatements were as good a product as one could hope for. But
Arnold further argued, if the problem it sought to solve was the “inflation” of
legal materials, it was not the solution. Rather than replacing the growing
mass of legal materials, the Restatements just became yet another source lawyers had to consult. Even worse, in short order, they generated their own secondary literature consisting of additional commentaries, defenses and critiques.221 As such, the Restatements were brilliant efforts of explaining away
the inconsistencies of the Ptolemaic system when what was needed was a
Copernican revolution.222
Have we finally found here the realist skeptics, the ones who doubted
the very idea of rules and their determinacy, who were skeptical of all values
and whose writings challenged democracy and the rule of law? Hardly so.
Arnold’s distinction is the familiar one between internal and external perspectives—between “science of law” and “science about law”—and his preference for the external perspective is to be expected from those who adopt a
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naturalistic, scientific perspective on law.223 Even in the
s, this approach
already had a substantial history. The simplest way of describing legal realists
who favored this external, scientific perspective is as modern-day Benthamites, something that many of them acknowledged.224 Seen in this light, even
their critique of the Restatements resembles Bentham’s critique of what can
be described as the restatement project of his day, William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England.225 Like their intellectual forebear, these
legal realists disliked the common law and its methods, and for similar reasons. The common law appeared to them, as it did to Bentham, as an outdated
method for making law, and more broadly, for solving society’s problems. If
the Restatements came to solve the proliferation of legal materials and their
growing disorder, they were, at best, a short-term fix that did not address the
root cause of the problem, which was the common law itself, a technique of
legal regulation and a form of legal practice that had run its course and should
be abandoned.
These realists were critical of the common law, a particular way of organizing law and of a particular approach to consolidating and analyzing it.
Rejecting it was the opposite of skepticism; it was an attempt to put law and
legal reform on what they thought is a firmer foundation. It is in this Benthamite spirit that Arnold stated: “When men begin to examine philosophies
and principles as they examine atoms and electrons, the road to discovery of
the means of social control is open.”226
E. The Real(ist) Benjamin Cardozo
I left for last my discussion of Benjamin Cardozo. I do so partly due to his
stature as one of the United States’ most celebrated judges, partly because
these days Cardozo has become something of a hero figure for a group of
scholars who define themselves in overt opposition to legal realism and its
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supposed skepticism about legal doctrine. 227 To them, Cardozo’s judicial
opinions and extrajudicial writings are a model of a sensible approach that
takes the law seriously.228 Responding to the suggestion that Cardozo was a
legal realist,229 John Goldberg retorted that Cardozo “one of the most sophisticated and accomplished anti-realist judges,” because he sought to “understand, articulate, and apply” legal concepts rather than “deconstruct or hide
behind” them.230 For those who hold this view, Cardozo’s opinions demonstrate better than any theoretical argument, the falsity of the realists’ skeptical
claims about legal doctrine.
In a way, this depiction of Cardozo as an anti-realist follows a pattern
encountered before, only in reverse. Starting from the assumption that the
realists were skeptics about legal doctrine and seeing Cardozo as the consummate common-law judge, the stage is set for seeing them as intellectual polar
opposites: He was moderate where they were radical, he was respectful of
legal doctrine where they were dismissive of it. Even on a personal level, the
image of the “saintly” Cardozo as conciliatory and gentle looks very different
from the image of the realists as brash and confrontational.
Following the strategy of this Article, I hope to reassess both Cardozo
and the realists. If we consider what the realists thought of Cardozo given
these facts about him, this gives us reason to re-evaluate them; and in turn,
this might also teach us something about Cardozo as well. Once we strip the
realists of their supposed radicalism, it becomes far easier to see commonalities between his views and theirs.
That Cardozo was a thoroughgoing anti-realist judge and thinker would
have surprised the legal realists. There can be little doubt that they admired
Cardozo and more-or-less uniformly considered him an uncommonly great
judge.231 In fact, with the possible exception of Holmes, it is difficult to find
227
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any judge that the realists as a group praised more consistently than Cardozo.
This was not the begrudging respect of the “most eloquent spokesperson for
the wrong view” kind; most of the legal realists considered him an ally to
their cause. 232 Llewellyn, at the height of his supposedly critical phase,
praised Cardozo for “remaking the judicial theory of the country.”233
That the legal realists thought of such a moderate judge as their hero is
itself a strong indication that claims about realists’ radicalism are exaggerated
and were not skeptics about law of legal rules. Granted, it is possible that they
misunderstood him, reading him more radically that he was. Just as I have
argued that CLS scholars misread the realists, it is possible that the realists
misread Cardozo, whose sinuous yet elusive writing style lends itself to multiple interpretations. But the realists were Cardozo’s contemporaries. They
knew his judicial opinions much better than most of us today. Some of them
(reviewing, among others, BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, LAW AND LITERATURE AND OTHER ES(
)) (“one of our greatest and most revered judges”); Max Radin, Case Law and
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an unfair treatment of his ideas by Cardozo, discussed in text accompanying notes
– ,
infra, Frank’s changed his tune. In these writings, Frank often singled out Cardozo for his
excessive attention to the appellate adjudication, even though (as Frank acknowledged) many
others, including most legal realists, had a similar focus. See Jerome Frank, Cardozo and the
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ambivalence towards Cardozo in a single sentence: “Cardozo was infected with appellatecourtitis, his description of the judicial process, superlative with respect to upper courts, is
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heard him deliver the lectures that would later become his books,234 some of
them corresponded with him and spoke with him in person. While they undoubtedly read him (as we all do) through the lens of their background and
opinions, it is unlikely they got him so completely wrong that they did not
see that he stands against everything they believed in.
The more straightforward explanation for the legal realists’, especially
those of a traditionalist orientation, esteem for Cardozo is that on many fundamental issues he held views that were remarkably similar to theirs. Cardozo
was possibly the first to use the term “formalism” as a label for the approach
to adjudication that many of the realists warned against: the pursuit of coherence at all costs, the disregard for social context, and the appeal to abstract
principles.235 In one of his best-known decisions he charged the lower court
of falling prey for the “jurisprudence of conceptions.”236 This term was Roscoe Pound’s translation for Begriffsjurisprudenz, a German jurisprudential
approach, whose adoption (real or imagined) at Langdell’s and Ames’s Harvard was the target of the realists.237 When Cardozo wrote that “[r]ules derived by a process of logical deduction from pre-established conceptions of
contract and obligation have broken down before the slow and steady and
erosive action of utility and justice,”238 he was making the exact same points
that the legal realists would make a decade later.
The similarity extends beyond Cardozo’s critiques to his positive ideas.
On many issues, big and small, Cardozo said things that aligned him with
234
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what the realists said. (Incidentally, on many of these issues Cardozo’s views
are quite different from those of his present-day admirers.) Like the realists,
he spoke of “living law” that responded to “social interests.”239 Like them, he
recognized the importance of the “structure” of legal doctrine, but argued that
law existed to serve “social welfare,” so that when the two clash, structure
should yield to its functional goals.240 Like them, he suggested that the aesthetic of legal structure was functional and that excessive focus on internally
coherent solutions is undesirable when it comes at the expense of improving
the law to serve the ends of the people.241
Cardozo believed that law was influenced by changing social ideas. He
quoted Theodore Roosevelt approvingly for the view that when judges decide
cases dealing with “economic and social questions,” their judgments “depend
upon their economic and social philosophy.”242 This was true of private law
than to public law. In the former no less than in the latter, judges rightly considered the implications of their choice of rule for the rest of society. 243
Cardozo went one further and rejected any sharp distinction between the two.
Unlike many of his present-day admirers, who insist that private law is completely separate from both public law and politics, Cardozo rejected the idea
that legal categories reflect unchanging conceptual or metaphysical truths or
that they were neatly separate from each other. “Classification,” he said,
“must be provisional, for forms run into one another.”244 But even if such
metaphysical truths existed, that would not matter, because the common law
is not a “a replica of nature’s forms.”245
Individually, and especially when taken together, all these similarities
explain why there was so much that the realists liked in Cardozo. Perhaps
more than any specific idea, what made Cardozo appealing to the realists was
his candor—or, to use another word, his realism—about adjudication.
239

Compare id. at , with the sources cited in note , supra.
Compare CARDOZO, supra note
, at – with Llewellyn, supra note , at
.
241
Compare CARDOZO, supra note
, at and Benjamin N. Cardozo, PROC. N.Y.
,
(
) (Cardozo’s address did not have a title) [hereinafter
ST. B. ASS’N REP.
Cardozo, Address] with Llewellyn, supra note , at
(“Structural harmony, structural
grandeur, are good to have, they add, they enrich; but they are subsidiary. So is ornament.
Legal esthetics are in first essence functional esthetics”) and LLEWELLYN, supra note , at
.
242
Id. at
(quoting CONG. REC., pt. at (
) (statement of President Theodore
Roosevelt)); see also BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE –
(
) (discussing the influence of changing social attitudes on the law).
243
CARDOZO, supra note
, at – , – . For examples of cases where he invoked such considerations see Ultramares Corp. v. Touche,
N.E.
,
(N.Y.
).
244
Benjamin N. Cardozo, Law and Literature, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN
NATHAN CARDOZO
,
(Margaret E. Hall ed.,
).
245
CARDOZO, supra note
, at
.
240

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4142277

Cardozo opened and closed his best-known book, The Nature of the Judicial
Process, by acknowledging that it was an inescapable fact that judges’ personality and background will influence their judicial outlook.246 In a later
book, Cardozo spoke openly about the influence of intuition on adjudication,
making the point a few years before Hutcheson’s scandalous article. 247
Cardozo did not even shy away from the suggestion that doctrinal formulas
were sometimes a cover for outcome-driven reasoning. Describing one of his
own decisions, Cardozo wrote:
I am not greatly concerned about the particular formula through which justice
was attained. Consistency was preserved, logic received its tribute, by holding
that the legal title passed, but that it was subjected to a constructive trust. A
constructive trust is nothing but “the formula through which the conscience of
equity finds expression.”248

When the legal realists pronounced such views, they were often seen as
advancing skeptical views about law, legal rules, or legal reasoning. Based
on such claims the realists were thought to deny the authority of law, as they
showed that judges were free to decide cases any way they wanted, and therefore to deny that law could have any objectively determinable content. From
here, it is but a small step to skepticism about the very possibility of the rule
of law and with it the legitimacy of legal coercion. Despite Cardozo making
similar points, he was not seen in this way, perhaps because Cardozo’s writings offer an answer to this challenge. But at its core, Cardozo’s answer is no
different from the answer, mentioned several times already, given by many
legal realists: The law derives its authority from its correspondence with the
values of the community.249 For both Cardozo and traditional legal realists
life was the ultimate test of law.250 And consequently, both dismissed any
sharp distinction between law and non-law, between law and custom, between law and life.
Cardozo went some way toward explaining how this vague idea could
have real-world bite. Just after the words he quoted from Roosevelt, Cardozo
added to them a normative gloss: “My duty as judge may be to objectify in
law, not my own aspirations and convictions and philosophies, but the aspirations and convictions and philosophies of the men and women of my
246
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time.”251 Thus, the idea that law’s ultimate aim was to promote social welfare,252 did not mean ceding the law to economists or philosophers. It meant
checking the law against the mores of the community.253 As Cardozo put it,
“[t]he standards or patterns of utility and morals will be found by the judge
in the life of the community.”254 It is this simple idea that purports to explain
how a judge may be human (and as such influenced by her background), and
yet can produce objective decisions that are not merely an expression of her
personal preferences.255 The process of “translating” the values of the community into concrete legal rules is what gave judge-made law its legitimacy.
To some, this view may appear obvious and even banal; to others, it may
sound hopelessly romantic and naïve; still others may find in it an attempt to
create a false sense of unity over social values and perhaps also an elitist attempt of one social group to impose its value judgments on the rest of society.
This view, then, is not free from criticism, but it is clearly not skeptical or
nihilist. It is somewhat conservative, and by now should be familiar. It is
Corbin’s Sittlichkeit.256 It is Llewellyn’s notion of natural law arising from
the views of the people. In fact, Cardozo himself used the very same term,
“natural law,” in precisely this sense to describe his own views. Properly understood, he said, natural law should not be understood as unchanging verities
but as what is “fair and reasonable men, mindful of the habits of life of the
community” and based on the “standards of justice and fair dealing prevalent
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among them.”257 This is, said Cardozo, what prevented judge-made law from
being “intolerable in its oppression.”258
All this shows that the supposed deep intellectual opposition between
the radical skepticism of the legal realists and the constructivism of Cardozo
is not there. The realists admired Cardozo because in writings that often preceded theirs, he expressed views that were in line with theirs. If there are any
remaining differences, they are over nuance, emphasis or tone, not substance.
This broad alliance between Cardozo and traditional legal realists is confirmed when considering his most direct engagement with their works. In
Cardozo delivered an address before members of the New York State
Bar Association, which was published shortly afterwards. In the familiar narrative, this address is presented as another example of the fundamental rift
between the legal establishment and the young radicals. Thus, White described this lecture as an “attack” on the realists, made worse by the fact that
Cardozo did not name any of them.259 Having delivered it in the aftermath of
the testy exchange between Pound and Llewellyn, White drew the battle lines
with Pound and Cardozo as representative of the older establishment on one
side, and the legal realists as the radical vanguard on the other.
I think Cardozo’s address shows the opposite. Cardozo’s lecture was
dedicated to then-recent jurisprudential ideas and paid special attention to the
work of “a group of scholars styling themselves realists.”260 He cited many
of their works (unlike Pound’s attack that contained no citations) and showed
remarkable familiarity with many of their works—books, articles, even book
reviews—especially with the writings of Frank and Llewellyn. Though
Cardozo was critical of aspects of the realists’ work, accusing them of some
obscurity of style and exaggerations, he acknowledged that “these extravagances are not of the essence of the faith.”261 Overall, however, his assessment was measured and the unquestionably friendly. He distanced himself
from suggestions that adjudication is purely an emotional reaction to the case,
that there are no legal rules that guide the judges or that the law is purely
257
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subjective, but also said he was “wholly one” with the realists in their criticism that the pursuit of coherence at the expense of other goals and in their
belief that law was a means to an end.262
It is notable that Cardozo used the term “neo-realists,” because, as he
pointed out, many had expressed similar ideas before them. One such earlier
realist Cardozo mentioned was the nineteenth-century German legal scholar
Rudolf von Jhering. This is significant because a decade earlier, Cardozo described the idea that law is a means to and end as “Jhering’s great contribution
to the theory of jurisprudence,” and something that “must be ever in the
judge’s mind,” an idea he wholeheartedly embraced as part of a pragmatic,
functional approach to law.263 None of this was an attack on the realists, and
evidently most of the legal realists did not understand it as such, as they did
not waver in their admiration for him. Only a year after the publication of
Cardozo’s address, Llewellyn published in Germany his book on American
common law and dedicated it to Cardozo.264 When some fifteen years later
Cardozo’s address was republished in a collection of his works, Llewellyn’s
enthusiastic review, which described Cardozo as “one great man of our law,”
praised the address as a “careful study” that lawyers must read to understand
the doubts that come with adjudication.265
It is true that one realist reacted differently. After reading Cardozo’s published article, Frank sent Cardozo a lengthy letter complaining about the way
Cardozo had described his views. Cardozo responded disarmingly, but Frank
proved difficult to appease.266 (One wonders if Frank’s later ambivalence toward Cardozo has its roots in this incident.) Given the gentle tone of
Cardozo’s treatment of the realists’ work, Frank’s reaction seems rather odd.
But it was typical of Frank, who was something of a repeat offender when it
came to responding to his critics with letters far longer than their critique.267
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He did this often enough that a Time magazine profile noted his habit of writing letters to “unfriendly newspapers…always defending his views.”268 He
was particularly incensed when he thought the critique to be based on a misrepresentation of his ideas.
However, when considered attentively this exchange does not support
the narrative of a fundamental difference between Cardozo and the realists; it
undermines it. The point of Frank’s letter was not to try to argue with
Cardozo’s views, to try and convince him to adopt a more radical or skeptical
position. As with his other epistolary outbursts, Frank complained that
Cardozo presented the realists’ views as more extreme than they actually
were.269 It turns out that already then, Frank—invariably described as the
most nihilist and extreme of the realists—complained that his views were
being misinterpreted.

II. THE REALITY OF LEGAL REALISM
So far, my aim has been to challenge those who claimed, as Horwitz once
did, that “[t]he Legal Realist movement…represents the one real example in
American history of a sharp break in prevailing legal thought,” because it
“challenged the premises of reigning legal orthodoxy in ways so fundamental” that the full implications of its attack had yet (at the time of writing) been
recognized.270 This hyperbolic claim has little relation to what one finds in
the work of the realists, and appears more like a critical scholar’s projection
of his own views onto others. Concretely, my arguments have been directed
at the more the familiar claim that the realists were jurisprudential radicals
who “stressed the uselessness of legal rules and concepts.”271 Though familiar, it turns out that such claims are simply not supported by the evidence.
Most of the legal realists were mainstream lawyers, who recognized the reality of legal rules and their importance, and wrote scholarly works analyzing
nevertheless unhappy with the review and sent Radin a seventeen-page letter explaining why.
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them. It is true that they insisted that law was more than legal doctrine, but it
is a gross misrepresentation of their view to think that they did not consider
legal doctrine an important part of the law. They knew it, they taught it, and
they wrote about it. Judging by their footnotes, they read many more cases
than most contemporary legal academics, and they took them seriously. (And
they didn’t even have Westlaw.)
Most of them saw their role as preparing young people (mostly men) to
legal practice. Given the law schools most of them were based in, they knew
this meant preparing these budding lawyers to work in Wall Street law firms.
Most of them were evidently untroubled by this fact, to say the least.272 They
had little time for the idea that law was a tool for oppression; on the contrary,
many of them considered law as one of the primary means for improving
society. They did not seek to show that law was irrational. As Frank, the realist accused most frequently of holding such a view, put it: “By pointing out
how much of our thinking is based on the non-rational, it may be possible for
us to increase the scope of the rational.”273
There may be one snag to my argument. Jerome Frank himself said of
the realists that they are skeptics, distinguishing between “rule skeptics” and
“fact skeptics.”274 Here is the unforced admission, by one of the best-known
legal realists, that they were skeptics. The easiest way of responding to this
challenge is to say that this was just Frank’s view, which need not have reflected accurately the views of other realists. But this response is too easy.
The more significant point is that if we look at what Frank meant by these
terms, we see that he gave them a more moderate meaning than the labels
would suggest. With respect to rules, Frank’s point was that the realists dismissed some presentations of existing rules as false. At the same time, the
rule skeptics, he said, were trying to identify the “‘real rules’ [which were]
descriptive of uniformities or regularities in actual judicial behavior.”275 To
believe that there are “real rules” is to believe that rules exist, that they can
be identified, described, and followed. Nothing stops us from calling the totality of these patterns “the law.” This view need not deny that the legal materials are relevant for determining the content of the law, only that they are
insufficient. The legal realists acknowledged all this. They repeatedly
acknowledged that with respect to most cases, the law is predictable, and not
one of them denied that the information contained in “standard” legal
272
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materials (cases and statutes) was irrelevant for this ability to make predictions.276 In one of his earliest writings, Frank himself said that “no sane person would deny” that “doctrines or ‘rules’ found in previous cases ha[ve]
some effect on decisions.”277 He also warned against misattributing to the realists the view “there are no rational or ethical factors in legal thinking.”278
Frank considered himself as belonging to the group of “fact skeptics.”
Unlike the rule skeptics, who focused almost all their attention on appellate
courts, the fact skeptics were (also) concerned with fact finding at trial. But
this too was not really a skeptical view, in the sense of doubting the existence
of reality or the possibility of knowing the truth. Frank’s down-to-earth worries were based on his observations on the unreliability of the methods of fact
finding at trials. In alerting to this problem his motivation was that of a reformer worried about the injustice of judicial decisions based on a mistaken
finding of facts. It is fair to say that in the time since Frank raised these issues,
his concerns have been vindicated by countless empirical studies confirming
his observations.
Those who have made it all the way to here may still have one remaining
worry. In presenting the realists as so mainstream, I invite an obvious challenge. If all this is true, how did legal realism become a “thing”? If indeed
the realists were so middle-of-the-road, both legally and politically, is it only
a talent for self-promotion that allowed them to present themselves as novel
and radical? Apart from this historical question, on a more theoretical plane
one may wonder what use there is to “legal realism” as an idea. Brian Tamanaha made this point forcefully in his book Beyond the Realist–Formalist
Divide. Though Tamanaha argued briefly that the realists were not skeptics
about adjudication,279 his main strategy is the opposite to my own. Rather
than focus on the realists’ works, he examined the work of their predecessors
with the aim of showing that many ideas attributed to the realists were said
by others before them. In some cases, he argued, these are found in the works
of scholars nowadays considered leading formalists.
It is no surprise that in the period immediately preceding the realists not
everyone expressed “formalist” views. As already mentioned, Cardozo called
the realists “neo-realists” precisely because he found so many of their ideas
276
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similar to those of earlier scholars. Llewellyn himself openly acknowledged
that most of the realists’ ideas were not new.280 Nevertheless, Tamanaha’s
book is significant because the early recognition of the continuity of realists’
ideas with work that came before them gave way to exaggerated claims about
the epoch-making originality of the realists.281 In this respect, Tamanaha’s
main goal (showing that realist-sounding ideas were made before the realists)
and my own (showing that the realists were far less radical than they are often
depicted) are different yet complementary.
However, Tamanaha drew two conclusions from his historical findings,
and those are quite different from my own. First, he argued that the realists
attacked a strawman, because their targets did not hold the views the realists
attributed to them. Moving from history to theory, Tamanaha further argued
that the distinction between realism and formalism is “empty” and could be
dispensed with without loss.282 I disagree with both claims. In explaining my
view, however, I have to respond to a challenge I myself posed to Tamanaha.
In another essay, I argued that a difficulty with Tamanaha’s claim that there
was nothing new to the realists’ claims is that he cannot account for the fact
that many of their contemporaries considered their ideas challenging.283 If, as
I suggest, the realists were not the skeptical radicals of their popular image,
the same question can now be directed at me.
As the main aim of this Article has been to revise popular views on the
legal realists, here is not the place for a full discussion of their intellectual
adversaries.284 Key to my answer to the challenge is that it does not lie in
claims about adjudication or indeterminacy; it lies in competing views about
authority. Once we see that, many of the issues addressed earlier no longer
appear mysterious. We have no difficulty understanding why the legal realists
280
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admired Cardozo, why they were not skeptical about legal rules nor particularly troubled by indeterminacy. I focus on this issue not because it is the only
difference between realists and formalists, but because it highlights once
again the distorted image of the realists as rule skeptics. I will argue that at
least when it comes to traditional legal realists, they did not pose—as often
depicted—a modernist challenge to the “classical legal thought” of the previous era; on the contrary, their critique was a traditionalist reaction to the
modernist innovations coming from Langdell’s Harvard.285
To get a sense of the intellectual scene, one must resist two tempting
tendencies. The first is dividing history into neat packages, “ages” as they are
sometimes called, each dominated by a certain intellectual outlook that most
everyone shared. When it comes to American legal thought, this outlook is
presented entertainingly but with little finesse in Grant Gilmore’s The Ages
of American Law.286 All it takes to see the futility of this idea is to think of
our time and see that there is no one governing idea that everyone accepts,
and then recognize that there is no reason to think that our “age” is somehow
special.287 When this is recognized, it is no wonder one can find legal realism
before the legal realists.
This “spirit-of-the-age” thinking encourages a neat narrative of intellectual progress from the age of “legal formalism,” the era of “premodern” or
“classical legal thought,” a time when most everyone believed that law was
a matter of deduction from unchanging first principles,288 to a time dominated
by the “quintessentially modernist jurisprudence” of the legal realists.289 This
account has led, as detailed above, to mythmaking with respect to the novelty
285
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of the legal realists. It has also led to ignoring the fundamental opposition
between the two strands of legal realism, which on “modernization,” as on
many others issues, held opposing views.
The heart of the problem is the tendency to see the realists as Promethean
figures who brought the gift of fire to humanity, there is a tendency to treat
them as thinkers who challenged all legal thought that came before them.290
The reality is, I think, different. The realists had a more local, and more contemporary, target. They challenged a view that had some strong proponents
in the legal academy of their day, and which they conveniently, if inaccurately, reduced to one place and the legacy of one man: Harvard Law School
and its first dean, Christopher Columbus Langdell. The critique was in some
ways unfair, as there is a good case to be made that Harvard was where the
modern version of American legal realism was born.291 But the attack on Harvard was not entirely spurious because there was a group of prominent and
influential scholars based at Harvard, who advanced ideas that were different
from the realists’. There was a point to targeting them even if their views
were overall a minority, because their prominence meant that these ideas
would likely spread elsewhere. Moreover, being the leading law school in the
country meant that the critique was significant. If Harvard provided the
wrong ideas to its students, it mattered, because many of them would go on
to lead the country’s legal and political establishment.
This point is relevant also in the other direction. It is not a surprise that
we find “realist”-sounding statements before the legal realists. If one thinks
the legal realists were the first to come up with the ideas now commonly
associated with “legal realism,” then the fact that many advanced “realist”
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ideas before them is a challenge to their supposed originality. If we understand their critique as directed at a particular yet powerful view advanced by
some of their (near) contemporaries, we can see the historical significance of
their views even if we don’t see that they made points not made by anyone
before them.
Now, to say that the legal realists targeted Langdell is hardly news. I
nevertheless want to flip the narrative by arguing that the legal realists’ attack
on him—or more precisely, the attack of a group among them—was motivated by a desire to turn the clock back on modernist changes Langdell was
partly responsible for.
A. The Modernist Langdell
Practicing law to Langdell meant the writing of briefs, examination of printed
authorities. The lawyer-client relation, the numerous non-rational factors involved in persuasion of a judge at a trial, the face-to-face appeals to the emotions of juries, the elements that go to make up what is loosely known as the
“atmosphere” of a case,—everything: that is undisclosed in judicial opinions—
was virtually unknown (and was therefore meaningless) to Langdell. A great
part of the realities of the life of the average lawyer was unreal to him.292

This, from Frank, is one of the more favorable descriptions of Langdell. He
comes off as a slightly pathetic, lifeless figure who only found solace in the
company of books. Inevitably, the image law that such a person espoused was
similarly lifeless. Harsh though this may seem, for later critics, this description was too kind. For them, Langdell was an “essentially stupid man,” a figure who deserves scorn and even hatred.293 It is very easy to take these descriptions and derive from them all the familiar clichés about legal formalism:
Formalists believe that law as an unchanging set of rules, completely divorced from social reality, existing for its own sake regardless of its realworld consequences. Can someone holding such views be in any way redeemed?
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To understand Langdell, we need to see him as part of the modernizing
and professionalization effort of the university, no longer perceived as a finishing school for young gentlemen, but as a research institution dedicated
primarily to the advancement of knowledge.294 Such a conception of the university raises a pertinent question: What place is there for a law school within
such an institution? For some, none whatsoever. As late as
, economist
Thorstein Veblen expressed the view that having law schools within a university made as much as having schools for fencing or dancing.295 This is a plausible challenge, and one deserving an answer: Trades are best learned at a
trade school, and crafts are best at the workshop. Whether you think of law
as one or the other, why teach it at a university?
Langdell’s response to this challenge was a kind of confession and
avoidance. Yes, universities should only focus on the study and teaching of
science. Langdell made his position abundantly clear when he wrote: “If law
be not a science,” i.e., if law is but a “species of a handicraft,” then “a university will consult its own dignity in declining to teach it.”296 Of course,
Langdell’s point in saying this was that law was a science; in fact, he said, it
was “one of the greatest and noblest of sciences…with which the most vital
interests of the public and the State are closely bound up.”297 Langdell’s aim
was thus to justify the teaching of law at a university by elevating it from its
lowly status as a professional trade and showing it to be a grander calling. As
his remarks show, thinking of it in this way was not meant to separate it completely from reality, but intimately bound with the public interest.
What kind of science was law? Civil law countries provided a model of
legal science. It was Germany in particular, whose universities were the envy
of the world in the nineteenth century, that showed the possibility of scientific
study of law. But though influential, the German model of Rechtswissenschaft
that was more “geometrical,” beginning from axioms and proceeding from
them, was difficult to transplant into the common law world where legal
294
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thinking was so connected to particular cases. Common-law style legal science was more inductive, treating the cases as botanical specimens to be classified. This is how we are to understand his notorious claim that the law library is the lawyer’s laboratory.298
Often left out in denunciations of Langdell is that in insisting on the scientific status of law, he was not oblivious to the practical elements of lawyers’
work. What he denied was that this “art” should be taught at a university.
Science, for Langdell, was universal and timeless; the practical side of law
was none of that: It was local and temporal, and as such, better learned in
practice.299 Langdell’s solution was, in effect, to divide legal knowledge into
two—science and craft—and insist that law school focus exclusively on the
former.300
There is a philosophical point underlying this view. It presupposes the
epistemological distinction between two kinds of knowledge, theoretical
knowledge or knowledge that something is the case, and practical knowledge
or knowledge how to do something.301 Knowing that a bicycle has two wheels
is an example of the former; knowing how to ride a bicycle is an example of
the latter. Langdell’s view that law school should focus on advancing and
imparting the theoretical knowledge of law was not the stupid idea that everything a lawyer can learn about law is to be found in the law library, but the
modest idea that all that a university can, or should, teach is theoretical
knowledge, the part that can be learned in a law library. Trying to teach the
practical aspects of law at a university would be a like university course instructing on how to ride a bike by reading a book.
There are many ways of challenging these ideas. We no longer think that
science as concerned only with the universal, or that only science is worthy
of university study. More concretely, the botanical analogy is imperfect
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because the Harvard legal scientists excluded as “mistakes” too many cases
that did not fit their classificatory scheme; that would be like a botanist ignoring plants that did not fit the existing classificatory scheme as “biological
errors.” There is also little doubt that Langdell’s personal characteristics, his
apparent preference for the company of books than that of clients, inclined
him to see the theoretical side of law as more worthy of academics’ attention.
But Langdell’s views were of his time and fit the then-emerging model
of the research university and specifically the vision of Charles Eliot, Harvard’s president at the time.302 More significantly, there is a solid core behind
this picture that remains alive to this day. The idea of unifying a mass of disparate observations under a unifying explanatory scheme is widely accepted
as the hallmark of scientific understanding.303 Many of the categories that got
formulated by these late nineteenth-century legal scientists are still very much
with us. Indeed, variations on this form of legal scholarship remains familiar
and are practiced by many who may shudder at the suggestion they were in
any way followers of Langdell.
This epistemological division of labor has a broader political point behind it. It is common to assume that the Langdellian view of law as a science
rested on the assumption that law is completely separate from society, but the
words quoted above from Langdell included his exhortation that law was the
most noble of the sciences because it embodies the “most vital interests of
the public and the State.” The project of organizing the common law must be
understood in light of this idea. Though there have been numerous efforts to
organize the common law before the late nineteenth century, it was still described by one legal scholar from that era as “chaos with a full index.”304 In
that state, it could not serve the vital interests of the public properly. The project of identifying its principles was part of a modernizing, even modernistic,
enterprise. David Garland gave a short summary of the main components of
this modernist approach. It is
an ideology that believes social problems are best managed by specialist bureaucracies that are directed by the state, informed by experts, and rationally
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directed towards particular tasks. This modernist attitude thinks in terms of
technologically refined, top-down mechanisms that minimize the involvement
of ordinary people and spontaneous social processes, and maximize the role of
professional expertise and ‘government knowledge’.305

Writing more specifically about the law, Galanter proposed several identifying marks for the process of the modernization of law, which include efforts of making laws that are uniform and universalistic, rational, and managed by expert professionals.306 Not every characteristic of modernization
fits the formalists’ ideas, but as Galanter himself noted, he was describing an
ongoing process.
If one looks for a summary of the intellectual outlook of Langdell and
his most dedicated disciple Beale,307 this is it. Law is conceived of as a body
of theoretical knowledge to be organized according to scientific principles.
The primary aim of law school was to educate carefully selected elites in this
knowledge so they could they apply it for the betterment of society.
Such a view did not imply a lack of interest in the consequences of the
law. On the contrary, the formalists clearly thought their efforts were ultimately directed at improving society:
[T]he common law which we teach and study in our schools, which we develop
in our writings, which we laud as part of our heritage, and secure by constitutional provision; that living thing, embodied and vitalized, and imbued with a
spirit all its own our lives are devoted to the study of it because it is worth
study; and it is worth study because it is capable of scientific analysis. We
American teachers of law have this new scientific task which is peculiarly ours.
It is worth doing in itself. It is essential to progress and reform. It cannot be
done for us by anyone else.308

Beale also believed—contrary to a view often attributed to the formalists—laws changed with time, and that they needed to adapted to changing
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circumstances. He even considered the sociological study of law to be of
great value.309
In what sense, then, was he expounding views different from those of
the realists? The answer is that the realists, or more precisely the betterknown element within them, reacted against this modernistic, elitist conception of law. Theirs was a traditionalist, populist view.
B. The Realist Antimodernist Reaction
I have so far alluded a distinction between two strands among the legal realists. I now have to state the difference between the two more clearly. The two
realist groups had rival philosophical outlooks about what gave law its authority, and these differences resulted in very different scholarly orientations
and often to disagreements over prescriptions about legal reform, legal scholarship, and legal education.310
The first group among the legal realists, I call “scientific.” This group
includes Walter Wheeler Cook, Felix Cohen, Herman Oliphant, Edward Robinson, and Hessel Yntema. Scientific legal realists were deeply impressed by
the spectacular progress of the natural sciences. They considered the methods
of the common law primitive and compared them unfavorably to the methods
of the natural sciences. They wanted lawyers to learn scientists’ methods of
collecting data and testing hypotheses and implement into the law. Scientific
legal realists thus were committed to pushing forward Langdell’s modernist
agenda.311 They accepted Langdell’s scientific aspirations and used the term
“legal science” with no hint of irony.312 Their main challenge to the conception of legal science of Langdell and Beale was that it did not go far enough.
True legal science was not to be performed in the law library but in the real
world.
Though these realists were often dismissive of lawyers’ primitive methods, they were in not skeptical about legal rules and definitely not moral
309
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nihilists. They believed that with by extending scientific methods to the study
of law, in order to improve our ability to predict how judges other public
officials would behave. With respect to normative questions, these realists
were typically openly utilitarian. Some of these legal realists went so far as
to argue that even disputes over values were factual disagreements, and as
such could one day be resolved definitively by using the same scientific methods used for resolving other factual disagreements.313 Like their intellectual
hero, Bentham, they believed once law were reconstituted on scientific principles it would undergo significant change, but they all understood their enterprise as constructive and reformist.
The other group of legal realists included Karl Llewellyn and Jerome
Frank, probably the best-known legal realists, as well as (among others) Max
Radin, Walton Hamilton, Leon Green, and Joseph Hutcheson. (Following the
discussion above, I would add Corbin and Cardozo to the list.) I call this
group “traditionalists,” and in the remainder of this Section I will focus on
these legal realists. I hope to show is that the views of realists who belonged
to this group have often been misunderstood as legal skepticism or even
moral nihilism were in fact something quite different, an affirmation of a tradition-bound approach to practical knowledge.
The first key to understanding the difference between these realists and
the formalists is that they disliked the idea of law as a science, because they
understood legal knowledge as practical. Law was an art, a craft, a practice,
all the way down.314 Consequently, “[n]ot rules, but doing, is what we seek
to train men for.”315 This view is sometimes misunderstood as “rule skepticism,” as a rejection of the very idea of legal rules. But the legal realists were
clear and consistent that this was not their view. Rather, what they rejected
was the view that legal rules alone decide cases, “rules-only skepticism” if
you wish.
Traditional legal realists argued that one cannot understand legal rules
outside the context of their factual setting, and that much that goes into the
practice of law is sensitivity to complexity of facts. One cannot understand
legal rules without paying attention to their context of application—the facts
of the case—something that is missing by Langdellian efforts at formulating
general principles in isolation. As Corbin put it in his early essay that
313
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Llewellyn so admired, “[i]t is not difficult to learn a set of rules; but we now
know that learning rules does not make a lawyer. A lawyer must know facts
and judges as well as rules.” This is the practical knowledge, the knowledge
how, that cannot be learned by “memorizing dogmas.”316
We can now see that there are real differences between the realists and
the formalists, even though they don’t correspond to the standard way the two
views are described. It is not that there is no legal doctrine or legal knowledge
more generally, and it is not that they do not matter. It is what kind of
knowledge it is: is it like knowledge that water boils at
degrees Fahrenheit, or the knowledge how to bake a good cake. The problem with the formalists is that they thought it was possible, that it was, in fact, the essence of
legal science to formulate legal knowledge exhaustively in the form of legal
rules. Against this, Llewellyn’s emphasis that “[w]hat…officials do about disputes is…the law itself,” and specifically his contrasting what judges say with
what they do,317 are statements about the irreducibly practical nature of legal
knowledge. Though this difference does not match the caricatures of either
legal realism or legal formalism, we see that it cannot be resolved by adopting
a-little-of-both “balanced realism.”318
Even someone sympathetic to my argument so far may ask: So what?
The epistemological distinction between theoretical and practical knowledge
seems too remote, too abstract, to have any real-world significance. Why
would lawyers, and especially lawyers who called themselves “realists,” care
about it? The answer is that the distinction is not purely academic. It reflects
competing normative conceptions of the authority of law which has realworld practical effects, and it is very much related to the modernistic project
pushed by Langdell. For to understand the traditional legal realists is to understand why they rejected this project.
Traditional legal realists sought to revive a view of the common law,
which they feared was being stifled by scholars who had an exceedingly
316
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“theoretical” approach to the law. For these legal realists, the scientific aspirations of Langdell and Beale (and, importantly, also those of the scientific
legal realists) were misconceived. These legal realists’ stance was a decidedly
antimodernist reaction to Langdell, and they were often quite explicit in calling for turning back the clock and reviving older ways.
There are numerous illustrations of this. In an essay written late in his
life, Llewellyn explained why he admired Cardozo’s famous judgment in
MacPherson v. Buick.319 It wasn’t for doing an “individual equity job” between the parties, nor even (as the “Torts boys” would have it) for its brilliant
new doctrine. For Llewellyn, the most notable feature about Cardozo’s decision was its “beautiful old method.”320 Decades earlier when asked to provide
a brief biographical sketch to accompany an article he published in a magazine, Llewellyn wrote this about himself:
He can be placed among the more recent thinkers as one of the few whose
revolt against revolt against more word-making in the law has not kept them
from realizing the power and value of legal doctrine and the past at the same
time that they see the urgent need for using both as tools to shape a happier
future.321
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Figure : Llewellyn’s biographical note for Survey Graphic

As this revealing self-description shows, Llewellyn did not dismiss legal doctrine; he rejected certain ideas about legal doctrine. The “old method” he was
yearning for, the legal doctrine of the past whose power and value he recognized, was what he called the “grand style” of adjudication, which he saw as
the dominant approach to adjudication in the nineteenth century but was then
supplanted by the “formal style” toward the end of it. Llewellyn was clear
that he preferred the older style and was happy to report that after a few decades in decline, it was making a welcome return.322
The yearning for a return to a lost past manifested itself in legal education as well. Both Frank and Llewellyn wrote extensively on legal education
reform. Both worried that legal education provided inadequate training for
future practitioners. Intriguingly, both of them lamented the loss of the traditional way law used to be learned before universities took hold of legal education. As Frank put it, something of “immense worth was given up when the
legal apprentice system was abandoned as the basis of teaching in the leading
American law schools.” He openly stated that improving legal education
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called for executing an “about-face and return to…[the] th century apprentice method,” albeit updated for the twentieth century.323
Turning this suggestion into reality meant making university legal education resemble the way one would learn law in practice. Frank favored a
much greater role for clinical legal education, and wanted it incorporated into
the regular coursework. In addition, against Langdell’s proud innovation of
appointing professors who had no legal practice experience, Frank urged law
schools to employ professors with five to ten years of legal practice experience.324 Llewellyn, while more skeptical than Frank about the merits of clinical legal education, declared plaintively that “[w]e need an apprenticeship
again.”325 He then suggested that some form of apprenticeship should follow
university studies but that the two be considered integral for one’s legal education, so that the law degree only be awarded at the end of the apprenticeship.326
These concerns fit perfectly an antimodernist agenda. James Scott contrasts the modernistic program with what he considers a superior alternative.
Its hallmarks are: fascination with community knowledge, admiration for
contextual knowledge, an emphasis on “learning beyond the book,” a contrast
between “scientific explanation” and “practical knowledge,” and an emphasis
on those things that are known automatically (i.e., intuitively).327
This traditionalism manifests itself in other, more concrete places. Consider a question that divided the formalists and the realists: Are legal rights
prior to remedies, or is it the other way around? For a Langdellian legal scientist, the answer was obvious: Our “secondary” remedial rights presupposed
a violation of a primary right, which implied that the primary rights were
logically prior to remedies. 328 This is an example of law as theoretical
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knowledge. Against this view, the realist idea encapsulated in the phrase “precisely as much right as remedy”329 suggests that it is impossible to know what
legal rights we have by armchair study of legal materials. What rights one has
is not a matter of knowledge that, because it depends on winning your case,
something that depends on a lot of know-how. If, for whatever reason, one
cannot get a remedy for the violation of one’s right, it makes no sense to say
that one has a right.
This prioritizing of remedies is sometimes presented as an intellectual
innovation, or as an example of a progressive critique of the law.330 But once
again, this is not what one finds in the realists’ writings. Instead, what one
finds is a traditionalist reaction to the Langdellian modernistic tendency to
think of the science of legal principles in isolation from their manifestation
in reality. It reflected the practitioner’s no-nonsense response to legal science:
Legal rights are not theoretical abstractions, they are meaningless unless you
can see their effects.331 This was a return to old common-law thinking.332
In the present context, it is yet another way of attacking the separation
of the legal domain into a science of “knowledge that,” to which one later
adds the realities of the practice. The only way one can speak of legal rights
as the subject matter of library materials alone is as “pretty playthings.” As
part of legal reality, the content of legal rights is determined by practices.
It is also important to see that this disagreement between traditional legal
realists and Langdellian formalists has an important political angle. However,
the political stance presupposed here by the realists is quite different from the
one often attributed to them. In the standard story, legal realists’ works are
depicted as posing a challenge to the very idea of the rule of law and democracy. Since they are also depicted as polar opposites to Langdell, he is inevitably depicted as conservative reaction. This view too needs reassessment.
For Langdell and his followers, law was a science to be disseminated to
a selective and rigorously trained elite, who had technical expertise not
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available to others.333 It sees the legal scientist as someone who possesses
specialized expert knowledge, and as such someone to whose expert opinion
society must defer, not because it is necessarily widely shared, but because it
is superior to the views of most people. Democratic societies turn to experts
to design their bridges; they should equally turn to legal scientists for the
design of their laws. Peter Birks, a modern-day Langdellian, called this “the
democratic bargain,” in which the people agree to cede some power to “unrepresentative experts” who administer the law independently of politics.334
Law developed in this way may not reflect people’s attitudes and that is exactly how it should be.
There is a striking but entirely unsurprising contrast between Llewellyn’s and Beale’s view of law in the early decades of the nineteenth century.
For Llewellyn, as we have seen, this period was the heyday of the grand style,
a time when judges embraced a porous conception of law, whose values
where in tune with the people. Beale’s assessment of the same period was
very different. During that period, he said,
even the Courts of common law, were still largely in the hands of people who
had little, if any, knowledge of law. The genius of the people was against specialization. It was the triumph of pure democracy, which believed, as it still
believes, than [sic] an expert is a dangerous thing, and that the best service is
to be got out of the man in the street, who is taken out of the street and nut in
high places. It is to be remembered that there was no teaching of law except by
apprenticeship in the lawyer’s office.335

When Beale described this era as the “triumph of pure democracy,” he
did not mean this as a compliment. It was an example of law in its primitive
stage of development, when law was guided by popular ideas instead of scientific principles. The development of a scientific conception of law implied
for him (just as it did for Birks) a democratic bargain, in which some questions are taken from the political domain and are to be decided by scientific
experts.
The realists’ opposition to this idea was at bottom political. It emphasized the embeddedness of law in the traditions of a particular community.
Thus, for Llewellyn, when courts adopt the grand style, they voice “not only
The Law, but…also the residual non-expert horse-sense of the community in
333
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the whirl of this technologically baffling world.”336 Turning the law into a
field of scientific expertise and insisting on a clear demarcation of law from
nonlaw, would inevitably lead to a disconnect between the law and the community’s sense of right and wrong. Thus, contrary to the suggestion that the
legal realists’ ideas were inconsistent with democracy, we can see how the
central idea of traditional legal realists was that the common law was an example of democracy in action. The good judge, if she does a good job, embodies in the law the values of the community.
For traditionalists like Llewellyn, then, law’s authority came from below,
from the people, and it reflects practical wisdom learned from experience
which cannot be systematized without loss. Despite all efforts, “the particularistic mass of common law remains notably resistant to large-scale systematization or to clean logical structure….[I]t gropes out of the earthly rooted
for better, but still earthy rooting.”337 It is not impossible to have law taught
and practiced in the Langdellian style, but it would be alien from the community. What would be lost is the tacit knowledge that is not taught “but absorbed through the pores or through haphazard imitation, or it is reinvented,
man by man, in the process of doing the job.”338 All this aligns traditional
realists not with radical reform but with conservative political theorists like
Michael Oakeshott.339

IV. CONCLUSION
In Some Realism about Realism, Llewellyn distinguished between the views
attributed to the realists to those of the “real realists.”340 In a way, this Article
aims to do the same. If I got things even roughly right, then much of the
popular understanding of the legal realists’ ideas is inaccurate. They were not
skeptics about the rule of law, they were not radicals who questioned the
foundations of democracy, they did not even think the law was particularly
indeterminate. In fact, the most famous and prominent among them were
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traditionalists who were skeptical of modernist trends and sought to revive
old conceptions of law.
Given the ubiquity of the term “legal realism,” and the place the legal
realists occupy in legal history and legal theory, it is a good idea to have a
clear sense of what the realists believed. But a skeptical reader may wonder
why. By now the term “legal realism” has acquired a life of its own; its meaning exists (or rather, its multiple meanings exist) independently of the views
of a fairly small group of individuals active in the early decades of the twentieth century who used this label to describe themselves. It is by now part of
the mythology of American law, and probably beyond. This Article is not a
call for legal realism originalism, seeking to limit contemporary usage to the
original intent of those who coined it, or if it is different, to its original public
meaning. Ideas, and the meaning of the words used to describe them, evolve.
What happened to “legal realism” is not unique. Like other successful ideas—
think “democracy,” “Enlightenment,” or (for a more controversial example)
“originalism”—once “legal realism” became popular, many wanted in. To
accommodate everyone, the meaning of the term had to become fuzzier.
Lawyers, always on the lookout for practical implications of a historical
study, may then wonder: If the legal realists have no special authority over
the meaning of legal realism, is there any reason to dwell now on the views
of long-dead scholars? If legal realism has now acquired a meaning independent of the views of the legal realists, why should we care about what they
meant by the term? My answer is that the views of Llewellyn, Frank, or the
other realists are valuable not because they invented the term, but because
they reflect a plausible understanding of what it means to be realistic about
law. If we understand the term in its “textbook” sense—law is deeply indeterminate, legal rules don’t mean anything—then, despite its popularity, legal
realism looks like a failure. In
, Lawrence Friedman was incredulous that
something as pointless and ill-conceived as “restating (and rerestating) [wa]s
still going on.”341 Half a century later, it’s still going strong. And it is not just
the Restatements: A century after the realists, and half a century after CLS
and law-and-economics, legal doctrine is still very much alive. Walk into
most first-year classrooms and what you will observe is students learning legal concepts like “due care,” “expectation damages,” “adverse possession,”
along with numerous multiple-prong tests. Learning to think like a lawyer is,
apparently, still learning legal doctrine and legal reasoning.
Many academic lawyers are aware of this reality, and some feel a bit
embarrassed by it. How can they teach their students legal doctrine in good
conscience, when, as good legal realists, they know it is just a cover for
341
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something else? At times, legal academics sound almost apologetic for giving
any credence to legal doctrine, for teaching it, or analyzing it.342 Perhaps, if
they were to learn something about the original legal realists, they might feel
a bit better about what they are doing. It is realistic to note that there are
numerous factors, some conscious, others less so, that motivate and shape
legal doctrine, as well as the way it is applied in particular cases. It is realistic
to note that courts use legal concepts and doctrinal “tests” and that lawyers
who fail to understand or use them are very likely to harm their clients. It is
also realistic—not least because judges themselves often say so—that the legal concepts and the “tests” they use are aid to thoughts, not mechanical substitutes for thought. It is also realistic to note that despite formidable intellectual efforts to displace it, legal doctrine (often not fundamentally different
from the one in existence in the days of the legal realists) is still with us today.
The legal realists help us understand why.
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